20 years under Putin: a timeline

On October 11, the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., held a teleconference titled “The United States, Russia, and Syria: What Comes Next After Ceasefire Talk Suspension.” A group of Russia and Middle East experts discussed the situation on the ground, the drivers of Kremlin foreign policy, and what the United States can do about it. 

 

The U.S-Russia ceasefire negotiations on Syria were suspended on October 6. Meanwhile, the situation in a Syrian city of Aleppo is deteriorating: sieged by the Assas troops, it has been targeted by the Russian air forces. Photo: Basem Ayoubi / ImagesLive via ZUMA Wire / TASS.

 

Introduction:

The Honorable Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO, The Wilson Center.

Speakers:

Joshua Landis, Director, Center for Middle East Studies, University of Oklahoma.

Matthew Rojansky, Director, Kennan Institute, The Wilson Center.

Igor Zevelev, Former Director, Russia Office, MacArthur Foundation; and Wilson Center Fellow.

Moderator:

Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives, The Wilson Center.

 

Panel:

Harman:

  • Situation on the ground: U.S.-Russian brokered ceasefire has broken down.
  • UN resolution to halt airstrikes on Aleppo vetoed by Russia.
  • We are witnessing a repeat of the atrocities of World War II.

Miller:

  • A large part of the problem is that the war in Syria is being fought by both internal and external actors, leading to a “terrifying balance” in which there are no clear victors.

Landis:

  • New security architecture is being established in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon (likely to remain for the next 20–30 years):
    • Iran and Russia are constructing a sphere of influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon;
    • Iran sees Assad’s survival as a matter of national security—Hezbollah will cease to exist without support from Assad;
    • Hezbollah remains Iran’s security guarantee against Israel.
  • Obama refuses to escalate confrontation with Russia over Syria:
    • Reaction to George Bush’s overreaches in the region;
    • Obama doesn’t want U.S. to be policeman of the world.
  • Fragmentation among rebels:
    • Has made it very difficult for Clinton and Kerry to put together a viable political alternative to the Assad regime;
    • Extremism and anti-Americanism among Sunni rebel opposition is also a significant roadblock to alternative politics in Syria;
    • Little chance of a Sunni rebel victory in either Syria or Iraq;
    • Air power is the key to military advantage in the region.
  • What does Assad think?
    • Assad is convinced that Russia backs him without reservation and is prepared to help him reconquer Syria;
    • Assad and Putin have tacitly accepted Turkey’s involvement in Syria, viewing this as a development that could work in their favor.
  • In order to achieve stability in the region:
    • The U.S. has to admit that one side must win;
    • There is little chance for a political resolution between Assad and the rebels: Assad, Russia, and Iran are currently winning the war in Syria;
    • Ultimately, a U.S. intervention will only prolong the conflict—it must admit defeat.

Zevelev:

  • Russia’s foreign policy is driven by Moscow’s perception of itself as a great power with global reach;
  • Moscow’s actions in Syria are motivated by three overarching objectives:
    • Limiting the role of the U.S. in the world, encouraging multipolarity;
    • Replacing the U.S. as leading foreign power in the Middle East (Moscow is taking advantage of American fatigue of intervention in the region);
    • Stopping U.S.-sponsored “regime change” (Moscow believes the Arab Spring was the result of American meddling in the region).

Rojansky:

  • Why is Syria important for Russia? Russia is using Syria to establish negotiations with the U.S., in which Moscow is to be considered an equal partner:
    • It is impossible for the U.S. to intervene in Syria without first negotiating terms with Russia.
  • Syria is also meant to push back against U.S.-sponsored regime change, which Moscow believes occurred during the “color revolutions” of the 2000s and in Ukraine in 2014.
  • Russia has also used Syria to push its agenda on other issues:
    • If Russia doesn’t get what it wants in Syria, it will escalate the stakes in other areas (e.g. Ukraine);
    • Moscow is looking to involve itself in situations in which it can act as a key player.

 

Q & A

  1. How are we to deal with Syria’s victims? What are the international community’s options in dealing with this humanitarian catastrophe?

Landis:

  • Option 1: The rebels can disarm, after which civilians would be able to leave Aleppo;
  • Option 2: The U.S. could help rebels win against Assad and Russia;
  • So far U.S. hasn’t supported either option, and instead has blamed the situation on Russia. But with no action, the people in Aleppo will perish.

 

  1. Does the recent reorganization of Russia’s security services provide any evidence of instability from within the Kremlin? Does Putin face any political threats domestically?

Zevelev:

  • We can only speculate on what is going on inside the Kremlin, but there has been some talk that the Kremlin may eventually be challenged from within.
  • Challenges may eventually come from:
    • A repeat of political protests, similar to those seen in 2011–2012;
    • Economically grounded disaffection;
    • A split within the country’s elite.

 

  1. What is Turkey’s role in the current situation?

Landis:

  • Turkey is trying to move itself closer to Moscow in order to gain leverage against the United States.
  • The U.S. should remain wary about pushing Ankara further into Moscow’s orbit.

 

  1. What would bring Russia and America together over Syria? Could a solution involve reevaluating Europe’s security architecture (reconsidering NATO’s deployment near Russian borders)?

Landis:

  • The only circumstance in which the U.S. would reevaluate NATO’s deployment near Russia would be one in which we have no other option [to ensure] our very survival (e.g. imminent nuclear war).

 

* Daniel Frey is an independent writer and Russia analyst.