In this week’s Western media highlights, Stephen Kotkin in Foreign Affairs analyzes Russia’s foreign policy, which for centuries has been characterized by “soaring ambitions that have exceeded the country’s capabilities.” And in Vox, Mark Galeotti argues that Vladimir Putin is not as powerful as many Western observers imagine. Meanwhile, in the Russian media, Vedomosti covers an analysis by a group of economists analyze the country’s grim outlook for the upcoming decade, while human rights activists discuss the century-long transformations that have occurred in the Russian government and the public mind.
Philosopher and expert on geopolitics, Alexander Dugin is among those Russians who believe in expansionist approach in Russian foreign policy. Photo: Zurab Dzhavakhadze / TASS
From the West
Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics
Stephen Kotkin, Foreign Affairs
In this long read, Stephen Kotkin, a history professor at Princeton University, writes that for the last 500 years, Russian foreign policy has been characterized by “soaring ambitions that have exceeded the country’s capabilities.” Russia has been expanding geographically at a fast pace, but its economy has lagged behind that of other European countries. Today, the Russian economy accounts for only 1.5 percent of the global GDP, and its “resource-extracting, rent-seeking economic system has reached a dead end.” Kotkin argues that regardless of the original causes of early Russian expansionism, the Russian political class has come to believe that only further expansion can secure the country’s territory. Another driver of Russia’s foreign policy is the quest for a strong state, which has led to the controversial outcomes of subverted institutions and personalistic rule. Kotkin does contend that Russia is a “remarkable civilization” and that the post–Cold War world order was “unbalanced, even unfair.” But he maintains that this order did not stem from a desire of the West to humiliate Russia; rather, it was “the inevitable result of the West’s decisive victory … in a multidimensional global rivalry—political, economic, cultural, technological.” And today, it is not NATO or the West that poses an existential threat to Russia, but Russia’s own regime.
The Kremlin’s Triad as the Means of Survival
Lilia Shevtsova, American Interest
According to Shevtsova, civilizations such as Russia that are in a state of decay tend to improvise to survive, but their actions “often have dramatic implications for the rest of the world.” However, she argues that Russia’s current confrontation with the West is not the Kremlin’s final goal: “The Russian ruling team is not kamikaze.” Instead, the threat of confrontation is only a tool that the Kremlin is using to create “a favorable international environment for the Russian System” and “to force the West to accept the Kremlin’s game.” Shevtsova describes the Kremlin’s approach as the triad paradigm: “To be with the West; to be inside the West; and to be against the West.” (Some experts call such an approach “political schizophrenia”.) The Russian political elite have tried to force the West into a discussion on building a new, more just world order, but the Kremlin has left the blueprint for this “new world order” intentionally vague. Moscow is in this way pursuing a typical post-postmodern policy that mixes “incompatible elements” and maintains “blurred lines between principles and norms.” Shevtsova contends that a realistic understanding of Russia’s trajectory may be the “main challenge of the 21st century” and will be impossible “without some serious self-reflection on the part of the Russia expert community.”
The Putin Myth: The Russian Leader Isn’t Nearly as Powerful as You Think
Mark Galeotti, Vox
New York University professor Mark Galeotti writes that during his last call-in show, Putin tried to promote the idea that he is “the unquestioned and solitary master of his realm.” But according to Galeotti, this is a myth: even if Putin has the final word on every major policy issue in Russia, that doesn’t mean that he can and does control everything in Russia. His rule is essentially based on pacifying and balancing elite groups, but he can’t fix the country all by himself, and his powers are not unlimited. Galeotti argues that those who believe the myth about an all-powerful Putin give him more power than he deserves. He makes the key point that Russia’s political system is not a rigidly centralized dictatorship but “at times a marketplace of ideas in which Russia’s oligarchs, officials, commentators, and interest groups are engaged in constant competition to pitch their ideas to Putin.” In theory, writes Galeotti, “this could be a form of pluralism,” but in practice, “it is a system in which the policies that catch Putin’s eye and imagination have the best chance of success, regardless of their true merits.” (The creation of the National Guard could serve as the latest example of this system.) The author suggests that the West should stop fixating on Putin and instead focus on monitoring the public channels through which elites are sending their signals to Putin. Such a shift could help Russia watchers better understand what the Kremlin is actually thinking about.
From Russia
Higher School of Economics: Transformation of Russia’s Economy Will Take Ten Years
Olga Kuvshinova, Vedomosti
According to a report prepared by experts from the Higher School of Economics (HSE), inertia is the most probable scenario for Russia’s social and economic development in the upcoming ten years. The Russian government can maintain such a position while the country’s reserves last (a period estimated to be about two years), but after that, the country’s economy will begin to stagnate, with economic growth not exceeding 3 percent (a rate that Mikhail Abyzov, the head of Russia’s Open Government, considers an “overoptimistic forecast”). As federal budget resources diminish, the country’s social sector will be the first to suffer. According to HSE estimates, by 2018, government spending for social programs will have decreased by 30–35 percent. For now, the accumulated loyalty of the population may allow the government to make these cuts, but in five years, such measures may lead to a drop in the level of education and health care, an increase in incidence and mortality rates, and a general reversion to mass poverty. Reasons for the current trends are not only poor institutions, but also “state paternalism in the social sphere, the high inflation rate, and so-called ‘offshore capitalism.’” The authors of the report express hope that the Russian authorities will recognize the high social risks of their current policies and conduct the necessary reforms but acknowledge that, realistically, the possibility of such reforms is miniscule.
The End of the Negotiations Era: Why the Oil Summit in Doha Failed
Mikhail Krutikhin, Carnegie.ru
The failure of negotiations at the recent oil summit in Doha (Qatar) should not come as a surprise to anyone, argues Mikhail Krutikhin, a partner in the RusEnergy consulting firm, in this story for Carnegie.ru. OPEC’s attempt to manipulate thousands of U.S. shale companies, whose actions are determined by the profitability of their business and not the White House’s demands (and who are currently the key driving force of the global energy market). was doomed to failure. The summit has showed that the times of the oil cartels are behind us, as “technological progress has trumped politics.” It has also showcased the lack of solidarity within OPEC—not all members are willing to freeze their production levels to satisfy Riyadh’s requests. Moscow’s initiatives looked weak from the start, but it will be Russia who will most suffer from low oil prices and high production levels. The Kremlin has “piggybacked” on high oil prices as it has plunged itself into foreign adventures, leading the country into isolation and ignoring economic consequences. Krutikhin concludes that the new market realities might serve as a sobering signal for Russian leaders.
Vyacheslav Bakhmin: “If Freedom Has Not Been Achieved Through Suffering and People Have Not Been Fighting for It, It’s Worth Nothing”
Forbes.ru
As part of a series titled “Chronicles of the Falling Empire,” human rights activist Ludmila Alekseeva and Soviet dissident Vyacheslav Bakhmin reflect on the Stalin era, the Great Terror, and the ways Russia has changed over the last 100 years. Both agree that Russia has been significantly transformed in recent decades but note that, psychologically, many people have remained the same. According to Alekseeva, with Putin in power, the country has rolled back to the Soviet period; the current times, she states, remind her of the Brezhnev era. Bakhmin points out that today’s Russia—in contrast with the Soviet Union—enjoys access to large amounts of information. Nevertheless, both experts express regret that the Russian people are still very prone to propaganda. One explanation proposed for this gullibility is that people don’t really think about high-level foreign and domestic policy on a daily basis, and therefore, when it comes to these issues, they simply repeat whatever they have heard on TV. In reality, people are concerned about routine problems—health care, education, grocery shopping, work. Another explanation, then, is that constant evocation of the image of foreign enemies surrounding Russia and promotion of myths of the country’s patriotic past both serve as key instruments of mobilization. At the same time, Alekseeva and Bakhmin argue that propaganda cannot last forever, and eventually common sense will prevail. They also agree that in terms of mentality and culture, Russia is a European country, despite the fact that Soviet attitudes have deep roots in the public mind and “manifest themselves when the opportunity occurs.”
