20 years under Putin: a timeline

In this week’s Russian media highlights, foreign policy expert Vladimir Frolov explains the sudden shift in Turkey’s policy toward Russia and the sudden rapprochement between Erdogan and Putin. And Andrei Pertsev argues that the headline arrest of Nikita Belykh, a liberal governor of the Kirov region, might be politically motivated. Meanwhile, in the Western media, the Atlantic Council’s John Herbst writes that the West should not scrap its sanctions policy against Russia. And Mark Galeotti suggests that the Kremlin should cool its ardor over Brexit, as British secession might have serious repercussions for Russia.

 

Turkish president Recep Erdogan apologized to Vladimir Putin for shooting down a Russian jet last November. Photo: Depo Photos via ZUMA Wire / TASS

 

From Russia

Sudden Friendship: Why Turkey Decided to Restore its Relationship with Russia

Vladimir Frolov, Slon.ru

In his commentary on Turkish president Recep Erdogan’s surprising decision to apologize to Moscow for shooting down a Russian jet last November, Vladimir Frolov, an expert in foreign relations, argues that the move is the result of a major shift in Turkey’s foreign policy, which had reached dead-ends on a number of issues. Falling out with Russia was not Turkey’s only problem: Erdogan faced growing international isolation; the Syrian refugee crisis at Turkey’s borders continues to deteriorate; and Erdogan might have finally realized that his Syrian strategy was failing alongside his unjustified geopolitical ambitions to be a regional power in the Middle East. Frolov contends that the Kremlin will try to use Turkey’s apology to showcase Russia’s power on the international arena, but in reality Putin and Erdogan need each other like never before. “Both leaders are stuck in a war [with Syria] that they cannot win, and they cannot find a political solution either,” writes Frolov. He also recommends that Putin meet Erdogan halfway and normalize relations with Turkey because this window of opportunity may be his last chance to avoid a quagmire.

 

Three Degrees of Damage

Yekaterina Schulman, Vedomosti

In Vedomosti newspaper, political commentator Yekaterina Schulman summarizes the main results of the legislative work of the sixth State Duma. Over the last four years, it has passed 1,816 bills. By comparison, the UK House of Commons passed only 145 Public General Acts over the same period. Schulman names three reasons for this remarkable “productiveness.” First, semi-autocratic regimes like Russia benefit from legal instability: every new law expands the powers of the authorities and gives them new resources. The author quotes Taсitus, who said “corruptissima republica plurimae leges” (“when the republic is at its most corrupt, the laws are most numerous”). Second, in such regimes bills are usually passed under conditions of speed and secrecy, and, as a result, almost any new bill requires revisions. Thus, 85 percent of the bills passed by the current Duma are in fact amendments to existing laws. The third reason may actually show a positive side of the Russian regime, writes Schulman. Despite its facade of personalist and autocratic rule, “decree-based” law is not regular practice in Russia: the president prefers delegating responsibilities across the “administrative pyramid.” Overall, according to the author, the sixth Duma did not have a memorable performance, but it did manage to make Russian citizens pay more attention to the legislature, as it demonstrated to the world how a parliament should not work.

 

Why Arrest Nikita Belykh

Andrei Pertsev, Carnegie.ru

The arrest of the Kirov region governor Nikita Belykh, who was caught in flagrante as he allegedly received a 400,000-euro bribe, became one of the most discussed political developments in Russia this week. Journalist Andrei Pertsev, however, suggests that it’s too early to draw conclusions, especially since the Investigative Committee (IC) is known for pulling PR stunts for political reasons, and in this arrest, IC officers acted in a highly theatrical manner. Pertsev argues that arrests of high-profile officials in Russia usually coincide with important political events. In this case, the detainment and arrest of Belykh took place right after the launch of the Russian Duma election campaign. “The governor’s past [as one of the leaders of the liberal party Union of the Right Forces] provides yet another reason for a PR stunt [the goal of which is to convince the public that] this is what liberals will do if they gain power—God forbid,” says the author, noting that the special attention paid to the case by law enforcement agents guarantees maximum exposure in the media. Besides, Belykh’s name is a perfect fit in a group of liberals who have gained a controversial reputation through state propaganda—people like Anatoly Chubais, Alexei Navalny, and Maria Gaidar. All of this provides fruitful ground for conspiracy theories, including ones about manipulation by the “global cabal.” The Belykh case also serves to benefit IC head Vladimir Markin, who incessantly promotes the myth that his agency is fighting corruption at the highest levels.

 

From the West 

Now Is Not the Time to Scrap the Minsk Agreement

John Herbst, The Atlantic Council

John E. Herbst, director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council, discusses the Minsk agreements, and claims that it would be a serious mistake for Ukraine to abandon them now. Herbst does not deny that the Minsk agreements, like the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, have severely disappointed Ukraine. The terms of Minsk II were, in fact, worse than those of Minsk I, in that they give authorities in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) the right to retain armed forces, and call for a constitutional change that would grant autonomy to those areas. Minsk also excludes the U.S. from the diplomatic process. Despite these flaws, Herbst argues, Ukrainian leaders do not have the option of walking away from Minsk. Ukraine should understand that the EU is not currently in a position to push for a stronger policy toward Russia. Also, though Moscow has not backed down, economic sanctions from the West are having some impact. It’s probable that the sanctions, coupled with Western military assistance and the Obama administration’s growing interest in finding a solution to the conflict, will be sufficient to help Ukraine regain control over its eastern territories. As Herbst concludes, the Minsk process itself is working, and it’s greater than the terms of the Minsk agreement.

 

Why Vladimir Putin Is Cheering Brexit—and Why He Might Soon Regret It

Mark Galeotti, Vox

In his piece for Vox, Mark Galeotti, professor of global studies at New York University, argues that Brexit could cause serious problems for Russia. Galeotti begins by saying “There is no doubt that Moscow was hoping for Britain to leave the European Union.” It’s in the Kremlin’s interest to see a disunited and inward-looking EU, unable to resist Russia’s actions in its neighboring countries. The Kremlin hopes that Brexit, which is causing turmoil in Europe, will jeopardize NATO’s coherence by preventing its European members from sticking to their military commitments. Also, it’s likely that post-Brexit Britain will suffer economic troubles, and in its attempts to attract businesses, it will tend to ignore transparency and accountability regulations. “As a result, it would become a welcome hub for Russian dirty money and dubious business deals.” However, Brexit might also have consequences that could negatively impact Russia. In the first 24 hours after the referendum, for instance, Russia made a $3.7 billion paper profit on its gold reserves, but lost $1.2 billion dollars on its foreign exchange reserves, which were in sterling. If Brexit seriously weakens the EU, Russia will also be affected, because the EU as a whole is the country’s main trading partner. The growing economic problems will make it harder for Putin’s regime to retain the loyalty of elites and the masses. And, finally, Galeotti suggests that a weakened Europe might, in fact, lead to Washington’s direct involvement in regional conflicts in Ukraine and Central Asia—something the Kremlin will not welcome.

 

Russia and America: Destined for Conflict?

Dmitri Simes, The National Interest

Dimitri K. Simes, president of the Center for the National Interest, discusses U.S.-Russia relations and argues that the growing sense of confrontation between the two nations is not irreversible. According to Simes, the current animosity between Russia and the West has stemmed from “unrealistic and contrasting expectations held on both sides.” He analyzes Russia’s democratic experiment of the 1990s, which was heavily guided by Washington, and concludes that Russia, at a fundamental level, was unprepared for the reforms. Once the people, including liberal intellectuals, saw the reality of how democracy was working in Russia, their interest in Western ideas and their trust in the West’s moral authority rapidly declined. Simultaneously, NATO’s intervention in the Balkans, its growing assertiveness, and expansionism further estranged Russian leadership from the West. The Iraq War and 2011 intervention in Libya transformed NATO in Russian eyes from “a non-threatening organization to a military alliance,” ready to act without regard for Russian interests around the globe. Simes contends that despite the flaws of Putin’s regime, the U.S. could have successfully cooperated with Russia to confront Al Qaeda and other threats, possibly preventing 9/11 and the Boston Marathon bombing. Simes suggests that the U.S., sticking with its national interests, explore better relations with Russia and consider the possibility of certain concessions, such as providing guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO—especially if no one intends to accept it into NATO anyway.

 

Nini Arshakuni helped compile this week's roundup.