Institute of Modern Russia

Panelists:

Carl Gershman, President of the National Endowment for Democracy. 

Miriam Lanskoy, Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia at the National Endowment for Democracy. Author of The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost, with former Foreign Minister of Chechnya Ilyas Akhmadov. 

Kyle Parker, senior professional staff at the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives. He spent eight years on the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe focusing on democracy, rule of law, and human rights in the post-Soviet space.

Leonid Martynyuk, Russian opposition author, video producer, and journalist. He is also a member of the political councils of the Solidarnost opposition movement and a former member of the political councils of the People’s Freedom Party. He co-authored with Boris Nemtsov a number of reports, including “Winter Olympics in the Sub-Tropics: Corruption and Abuse in Sochi.” 

Maria Snegovaya, PhD candidate at Columbia University and columnist at Vedomosti. Her doctoral work has focused on sources of support for populist parties in Eastern Europe.

 

The documentary:

The event featured a premier of a documentary titled That Doesn’t Mean You Have to Kill Him, created by Leonid Martynyuk and political commentator Andrei Piontkovsky. The authors try to answer the question: Who was behind Boris Nemtsov’s assassination?

1. The role of Russian special services:

• According to Andrei Piontkovsky and Garry Kasparov, the sheer proximity of the assassination site to Red Square implicates Russia’s security services in Nemtsov’s murder.
• No surveillance footage of the murder has been found because the FSB itself likely participated in it.
• Russia’s security services had Nemtsov under surveillance 24/7:
• It is highly unlikely that his assassins would have escaped notice from state security services;
• The state concluded its investigation of Nemtsov’s murder in a mere six days, the shortest investigation into a political killing in modern Russian history. 

2. Perpetrators were Chechen officers:

• Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and National Guard Director Viktor Zolotov are devoted loyalists to Putin:
• Kadyrov has followed the rules of the game the Kremlin has established;
• Zolotov was promoted to influential positions because of his loyalty to Putin.
• Zolotov became a permanent member of Russia’s Security Council, which is the modern incarnation of the Soviet politburo
• According to Andrei Piontkovsky:
• Four of the Chechens accused of murdering Nemtsov were officers in the Chechen security service’s Sever regiment, a group loyal to Kadyrov;
• Kadyrov coordinated with Chechen security agencies to have Nemtsov killed.

• According to Akhmed Zakaev, Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister of the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria:

• Kadyrov is totally controlled by the Kremlin.

3. Masterminds never interrogated.

• In the year following the murder, not one of the plot’s masterminds was interrogated.
• According to Gennady Gudkov, Russian politician and businessman, former deputy of the State Duma:
• The government made a political decision to avoid a complete investigation of Nemtsov’s murder
• Likely sequence of events:
• Summer 2014: Putin instructed Viktor Zolotov and Evgeniy Murov (head of the FSB) to assassinate Nemtsov. Zolotov then passed instructions on to Kadyrov;
• Kadyrov mobilized Chechen security services, Zolotov organized his soldiers, and Murov organized the FSB;
• The teams conducted surveillance of Nemtsov’s movements around Moscow;
• The FSB’s goal was to arrest the assassins as quickly as possible, in order to weaken Kadyrov’s influence in Putin’s inner circle;
• After Putin realized that the rivalry between Kadyrov and the FSB threatened the stability of regime, Putin ordered the investigation closed.

 

 

Left to right: Miriam Lanskoy, Maria Snegovaya, Carl Gershman, Kyle Parker, Leonid Martynyuk.

 

The discussion:

Martinyuk:

• Putin and Russia’s ruling class are murderers;
• Foreign leaders who interact with Putin on the world stage effectively legitimize him and his criminal behavior.

Snegovaya:

• Anyone who disagrees with the Kremlin’s policies can come under attack (including people as benign as environmentalists).
• There has been an increase in attacks on the political opposition since 2012:

• The Kremlin has claimed plausible deniability by hiding behind pro-Kremlin grassroots groups: anti-Maidan protesters, Nashi, Russian Orthodox groups.
• Opposition members are prosecuted very strongly, while those who attack opposition activists are prosecuted very lightly.
• The Putin regime’s stability has been based on economic growth, but this strategy can no longer work, given the state of the country’s economy:
• Putin has used war and the idea of a “fifth column” of traitors to legitimize his rule;
• The Kremlin has attempted to exploit Russia’s “glorious past” to mold the future.
• Russia is moving toward a fascist political system.
• An increasing number of leaks have been coming from the Kremlin:
• People within the power structures are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo.
• Western sanctions have proven very damaging to Russia and its elites:
• As long as Putin remains in power, however, the sanctions will remain in place.

Lanskoy:

• Key figures in the protest movement of 2011–2012 have been neutralized: Boris Nemtsov (killed), Sergei Udaltsov (imprisoned), Yevgenia Chirikova (exiled), Garry Kasporov (exiled).
• The FSB has been leaking details on the investigation into Nemtsov’s murder to Novaya Gazeta, which comes as a result of the competition between Russia’s security services (FSB vs. investigative committee).
• The Kremlin has found that Kadyrov and Chechen security services are convenient to blame for problems if necessary, exploiting a  stereotype of Chechens as unruly and violent.
• The recently passed Yarovaya Law expands the state’s surveillance capabilities by increasing the potential for targeted repression and assassinations.
• Currently, the only check on the security services’ power is competition amongst themselves.

Parker:

• Western sanctions against Russia haven’t been intense enough:

• In reality, the Kremlin thought the sanctions were going to be worse than they turned out to be.
• Repression in Russia almost always targets the truth-tellers.
• Our battle with Russia is a battle for reality itself.
• Free media is the West’s most important weapon in this fight.

 

Q & A:

Why are there still so many people who don’t believe Putin was involved in Nemtsov’s assassination?

Martynyuk:

• Russian media is largely controlled by the state, and the media works closely with the FSB.
• Psychologically, it’s much harder to reach such a conclusion if one is located in Russia itself.

 

Concluding Remarks:

Snegovaya:

• Nemtsov’s death signified a new era for Russia;
• Russia is not democratic whatsoever;
• The question is what type of autocracy the country is—say, an electoral autocracy, or moving toward fascism.

 

Parker:

• The West must prepare for political instability in Russia;
• It should not be taken for granted that Putin will still be in power ten years from now, especially given the country’s current economic situation.

 

You can watch the full video of the film and the discussion below.

 

* Daniel Frey is an independent writer and Russia analyst.