On October 11, the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., held a teleconference titled “The United States, Russia, and Syria: What Comes Next After Ceasefire Talk Suspension.” A group of Russia and Middle East experts discussed the situation on the ground, the drivers of Kremlin foreign policy, and what the United States can do about it.
Introduction:
The Honorable Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO, The Wilson Center.
Speakers:
Joshua Landis, Director, Center for Middle East Studies, University of Oklahoma.
Matthew Rojansky, Director, Kennan Institute, The Wilson Center.
Igor Zevelev, Former Director, Russia Office, MacArthur Foundation; and Wilson Center Fellow.
Moderator:
Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives, The Wilson Center.
Panel:
Harman:
- Situation on the ground: U.S.-Russian brokered ceasefire has broken down.
- UN resolution to halt airstrikes on Aleppo vetoed by Russia.
- We are witnessing a repeat of the atrocities of World War II.
Miller:
- A large part of the problem is that the war in Syria is being fought by both internal and external actors, leading to a “terrifying balance” in which there are no clear victors.
Landis:
- New security architecture is being established in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon (likely to remain for the next 20–30 years):
- Iran and Russia are constructing a sphere of influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon;
- Iran sees Assad’s survival as a matter of national security—Hezbollah will cease to exist without support from Assad;
- Hezbollah remains Iran’s security guarantee against Israel.
- Obama refuses to escalate confrontation with Russia over Syria:
- Reaction to George Bush’s overreaches in the region;
- Obama doesn’t want U.S. to be policeman of the world.
- Fragmentation among rebels:
- Has made it very difficult for Clinton and Kerry to put together a viable political alternative to the Assad regime;
- Extremism and anti-Americanism among Sunni rebel opposition is also a significant roadblock to alternative politics in Syria;
- Little chance of a Sunni rebel victory in either Syria or Iraq;
- Air power is the key to military advantage in the region.
- What does Assad think?
- Assad is convinced that Russia backs him without reservation and is prepared to help him reconquer Syria;
- Assad and Putin have tacitly accepted Turkey’s involvement in Syria, viewing this as a development that could work in their favor.
- In order to achieve stability in the region:
- The U.S. has to admit that one side must win;
- There is little chance for a political resolution between Assad and the rebels: Assad, Russia, and Iran are currently winning the war in Syria;
- Ultimately, a U.S. intervention will only prolong the conflict—it must admit defeat.
Zevelev:
- Russia’s foreign policy is driven by Moscow’s perception of itself as a great power with global reach;
- Moscow’s actions in Syria are motivated by three overarching objectives:
- Limiting the role of the U.S. in the world, encouraging multipolarity;
- Replacing the U.S. as leading foreign power in the Middle East (Moscow is taking advantage of American fatigue of intervention in the region);
- Stopping U.S.-sponsored “regime change” (Moscow believes the Arab Spring was the result of American meddling in the region).
Rojansky:
- Why is Syria important for Russia? Russia is using Syria to establish negotiations with the U.S., in which Moscow is to be considered an equal partner:
- It is impossible for the U.S. to intervene in Syria without first negotiating terms with Russia.
- Syria is also meant to push back against U.S.-sponsored regime change, which Moscow believes occurred during the “color revolutions” of the 2000s and in Ukraine in 2014.
- Russia has also used Syria to push its agenda on other issues:
- If Russia doesn’t get what it wants in Syria, it will escalate the stakes in other areas (e.g. Ukraine);
- Moscow is looking to involve itself in situations in which it can act as a key player.
Q & A
- How are we to deal with Syria’s victims? What are the international community’s options in dealing with this humanitarian catastrophe?
Landis:
- Option 1: The rebels can disarm, after which civilians would be able to leave Aleppo;
- Option 2: The U.S. could help rebels win against Assad and Russia;
- So far U.S. hasn’t supported either option, and instead has blamed the situation on Russia. But with no action, the people in Aleppo will perish.
- Does the recent reorganization of Russia’s security services provide any evidence of instability from within the Kremlin? Does Putin face any political threats domestically?
Zevelev:
- We can only speculate on what is going on inside the Kremlin, but there has been some talk that the Kremlin may eventually be challenged from within.
- Challenges may eventually come from:
- A repeat of political protests, similar to those seen in 2011–2012;
- Economically grounded disaffection;
- A split within the country’s elite.
- What is Turkey’s role in the current situation?
Landis:
- Turkey is trying to move itself closer to Moscow in order to gain leverage against the United States.
- The U.S. should remain wary about pushing Ankara further into Moscow’s orbit.
- What would bring Russia and America together over Syria? Could a solution involve reevaluating Europe’s security architecture (reconsidering NATO’s deployment near Russian borders)?
Landis:
- The only circumstance in which the U.S. would reevaluate NATO’s deployment near Russia would be one in which we have no other option [to ensure] our very survival (e.g. imminent nuclear war).
* Daniel Frey is an independent writer and Russia analyst.