In this week’s Western media highlights, Jeffrey Stacey writes in Foreign Affairs that the Kremlin can claim “victory” in Syria, but its decision to pull out was in fact motivated by economic and PR concerns rather than goal achievement. Meanwhile, in Russia’s RBC Daily, analysts dissected the paradoxical ways Russians view corruption—by condemning corruption in the upper echelons of government and finding bribery somewhat acceptable. And in his commentary for Slon.ru, Vladislav Inozemtsev dismantles five common anti-American myths circulated in the Russian media today.
While Russian troops are pulling out, the war in Syria continues. Photo: Valery Sharifulin / TASS
From the West
Russia’s Pyrrhic Victory in Syria
Jeffrey Stacey, Foreign Affairs
In this piece for Foreign Affairs, Jeffrey Stacey reviews Putin’s achievements and losses in Syria in the wake of Russia’s military pullback. Putin has “upstaged the West” by acting as both a peacemaker and an instigator in the Syrian conflict; he has reestablished Russia as an influential global player; and he has maintained extremely high popularity ratings at home. On the other hand, Stacey writes, Putin’s adventurism in Syria led to the downing of a commercial Russian jetliner, resulted in a deadly confrontation with Turkey, has cost Russia economically, and has strengthened the Assad regime so much that Damascus is proving increasingly unwilling to participate constructively in peace talks. Stacey believes that Putin’s decision to leave Syria was motivated primarily by economic and PR considerations; by pulling out now, the Kremlin can claim “victory,” win sympathy over Western sanctions, and dampen war costs.
There may be a lot of reasons Putin changed Russia’s Syria policy, but showing up Obama is probably not one of them
Samuel Greene, The Washington Post
In this piece for The Washington Post, Samuel Greene of King’s College London dissects Putin’s decision-making on foreign policy. The author disregards the notion that the Kremlin’s Ukraine and Syria policies were designed to “outmaneuver” Obama on the world stage. This thinking, Greene says, unnecessarily discounts the domestic political considerations at play in Putin’s Russia: upcoming elections, a worsening economy, and continued Western sanctions. Assuming that Putin is a rational, “power-maximizing” actor, Greene believes that the Russian president will continue to prioritize domestic issues over purely geopolitical ones.
Three Rules of Kremlin Power
Maxim Trudolyubov, The New York Times
Russia scholar Maxim Trudolyubov draws comparisons between Joseph Stalin and Vladimir Putin’s “rules” of governance. Trudolyubov identifies three rules in particular: 1) attribute “all victories to oneself”; 2) blame failures on “subordinates or external forces”; and 3) manipulate “the party line” as circumstances dictate. Specifically, Putin took credit for Russia’s economic boom in the midst of high oil prices; he has blamed subordinates and the West for Russia’s current economic woes; and he has shifted Russia’s geopolitical and economic culture at will: “One day Russia is a business-friendly economy, the next it is a statist power. One day Russia is busy integrating with the former Soviet republics, the next day it is fighting them.” Trudolyubov argues that Putin is now taking credit for victory in Syria, allowing Russia’s president to escape blame for economic failure at home—just another page out of the Kremlin’s playbook.
From Russia
Sign of Respect: How Russians View Corruption
Aleksei Levinson, Lyubov Borisyak, RBC
In this opinion piece for RBC.ru, Aleksei Levinson and Lyubov Borisyak discuss Russians’ views on corruption. Most Russians—over 90 percent—agree that corruption is one of the greatest issues plaguing their society; in fact, 47 percent believe that corruption is worse in Russia now than it was in the 2000s, and 32% believe that it is even worse. Nonetheless, Putin’s popularity ratings hover around 80 percent; how is it that corruption is seen as a worsening problem, while the Russian president enjoys astronomically high approval ratings? The problem, Levinson and Borisyak believe, is that Russian political culture makes a distinction between corruption and bribery; in Russia, corruption is seen as a serious crime, exclusive to the upper echelons of government, while bribery is considered common and even permissible under a variety of circumstances.
The Economic Crisis and Protests
Maria Snegovaya, Grigory Frolov, Vedomosti
In this piece for Vedomosti, political analysts Maria Snegovaya and Grigory Frolov discuss protest movements in “neopatrimonial” states such as Putin’s Russia. In comparison with the political protests of 2011-2012, Russia’s current protests are largely economically motivated. Although Putin’s popularity ratings remain very high, they dropped from 88 percent in October 2014 to 82 percent in January 2016; Snegovaya and Frolov believe that the Kremlin is finding it increasingly difficult to buy off the Russian populace through economic rents—a key legitimizer of most neopatrimonial regimes. Although protests in Russia have proven somewhat sporadic and isolated thus far, Snegovaya and Frolov write that they could become increasingly political in nature, particularly if the country suffers a protracted economic decline.
Five Myths about America Circulated in Russia
Vladislav Inozemtsev, Slon.ru
Economist Vladislav Inozemtsev scrutinizes five common anti-American refrains being circulated in the Russian media today. First, Inozemtsev picks apart the notion that America’s economy fell apart during the Great Depression, pointing out that although times were tough, food production and life expectancy increased, and few people emigrated out of the country. Second, the author disputes claims that the United States consumes more global GDP than it produces. Even at the height of the United States’ trade imbalance, Inozemtsev argues, the difference was not so great as to validate claims that America freeloads off other countries’ labor. The Russian media has also posited that America has circulated more than a quadrillion dollars throughout the global economy, all without backing from a gold or other hard standard, effectively blaming America for the 2009 financial crisis. Inozemtsev argues that these figures are grossly inflated. In addition, while some Russian economists have claimed that America’s debt will eventually force the country to default, Inozemtsev argues that in actuality, the U.S. debt is not that large, and that much of this debt has accrued because the U.S. buys many goods and services abroad—a boon to countries such as Russia. Lastly, Inozemtsev dissects the Russian media’s insistence that the U.S. budget is extremely weighted toward military expenditures; he points out that America spends less on defense than it does on public health and social security, even in times of economic crisis. Ultimately, Inozemtsev believes that the Kremlin is reacting to Russia’s flailing economy in typical fashion—by blaming enemies.
This week's roundup was compiled by Daniel Frey.
