Another politically motivated trial, the so-called case of the “St. Petersburg twelve,” is about to resume in St. Petersburg, Russia. Twelve members of The Other Russia movement are accused of continuing the activities of the banned National Boshevik party. IMR presents an op-ed of Sergei Golubok, Ph.D., defense counsel for one of the accused, Andrei Pesotsky.
"Despite the absurdity of the accusations, I believe the verdict will not be in our favor," Eduard Limonov, Russian writer, political dissident, and is the founder and leader of radical National Bolshevik Party, said to an "Izvestia" correspondent on April 24, 2012.
Russia’s National Bolshevik Party (NBP), founded by Eduard Limonov in 1992, all throughout the 2000s played prominent role in protesting government policies and was known for its rather radical nationalist views. NBP members became notorious as a result of their spectacular anti-government actions, including takeovers of public buildings, such as courthouses, election precincts, military draft offices, and even the headquarters of the Ministry of Finance.
No matter what one thinks of Russia’s right wing nationalists, the Russian government’s criminal prosecution of this group under Russia’s anti extremist legislation can only be viewed as the Putin regime’s attempt to suppress active political opposition, whether it comes from the left or the right. The government’s persecution of the nationalist opposition began more than ten years ago and culminated with outlawing Limonov’s National Bolshevik Party in 2007. It continues today with the on-going prosecution in St. Petersburg of twelve nationalist activists for participating in an allegedly extremist organization.
The NBP ideology and political activities may (and should) elicit a mixed response with anyone concerned with the forces for reform in Russia. However, there is one undisputable fact: in all their actions, the NBP never resorted to violence. For example, in 2006, party members entered the Mariinsky Palace, home of the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg and distributed leaflets critical of the Assembly’s leadership and majority party. A criminal case against the NBP members was initiated but had to be dropped, due to a settlement between the latter and the “injured parties”—certain Assembly members and police officers.
In 2007, a year after the Mariinsky Palace events, the Moscow City Court determined that NBP was an “extremist organization,” which meant the party was banned from any political activity in Russia. Among the reasons the Moscow City Court gave as a pretext for its decision was the NBP’s actions at the Mariinsky Palace. In this connection, Ludmila Alexeyeva, the chairperson of the Moscow Helsinki Group and a well-known human rights advocate, made the following statement: “The NBP has evolved from a raucous and scandalous party to a normal one, guided by democratic ideals. Ironically, it was precisely at this point that it was charged with extremism.”
The judicial determination that NBP is an extremist organization enabled Russian law enforcement agencies to file criminal lawsuits against its members not for any specific activities but based solely on the fact of the person’s being listed on the party membership rolls. It was precisely for this purpose that the legislators introduced into Russia’s Criminal Code Article 282.2, which provides jail terms of up to three years for organizing, and up to two years for participating in, the activities of an organization that has been judicially determined to be extremist.
To avoid prosecution, the NBP members formed another party, The Other Russia through which they could continue their political activity. Since this new organization has not been adjudicated as extremist, it should mean that the mere fact of membership in it may not be basis for prosecuting someone under Article 282.2. In spite of this, the repressive machinery of the regime continues to bring criminal lawsuits against young activists, including members of The Other Russia, using every available pretext.
In a case that has attracted national attention, Taisiya Osipova (a young mother suffering from diabetes), an activist member in Smolensk, was sentenced to a 10-year jail term on charges of drug trafficking. According to the defense, the verdict was based on evidence planted by the police. Osipova has been in jail for more than a year while these proceedings were held and in all that time was permitted to see her young daughter only once. The verdict was later reversed, and Osipova was re-tried. Today, on August 28th she was sentenced to 8 years in prison.
On August 26, 2012 political prisoner Taissia Ossipova turned 28. This was her second birthday spent in prison. Today she was sentenced to 8 years in prison.
Earlier this year, a criminal prosecution under Article 282.2 was brought in St. Petersburg against twelve members of The Other Russia. This case is now referred to in the media as the case of the "St. Petersburg Twelve.” The prosecution resulted from a special undercover operation conducted by the police. After having infiltrated a group of the organization’s activists, the police agents persuaded some party members to conduct meetings in an apartment equipped with hidden video cameras. The recordings of the meetings held in this apartment eventually became the primary evidence for prosecuting the members by alleging that they really were carrying out their activities on behalf of NBP. The participants in these meetings did discuss political and socio-economic issues, but there was no mention of the NBP or display of NBP symbols.
In addition to the videotapes, the prosecution relies upon the documents (police reports and verdicts of magistrates) used in proceedings to impose administrative, non-criminal violations, against those who participated in demonstrations and rallies in support of freedom of assembly. These protests had been set up by The Other Russia members as part of the Strategy-31 protest rallies (held in front of Gostiny Dvor, a historic indoor shopping arcade on St. Petersburg’s Nevsky Prospect), which were dispersed by police. Strategy-31 refers to demonstrations held on the 31st day of each month that has 31 days to commemorate Article 31 of the Russian Constitution, which guarantees citizens’ right to assemble peacefully and without arms, and to insist upon government compliance with this provision.
This spring, hearings on the accusations against the “St. Petersburg Twelve” began in the Vyborgsky District Court of St. Petersburg under Federal Judge Sergey Yakovlev. According to the defense, with each day of hearings, it became increasingly clear that there were three legal problems with the prosecution’s case.
The first issue stems from the indictment itself: the prosecution lacks direct evidence that the meetings in the apartment were conducted by the NBP. The police attempted to establish the defendants’ connection to the NBP through a forensic examination conducted by “expert witnesses.” For whatever reason, the “experts” commissioned to conduct this examination had to be invited from Moscow: one of them was a former math teacher, another one—a certain cultural psychologist, whose college transcripts include mostly such subjects as the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the foundations of Marxism-Leninism. These experts performed an analysis of video camera tapes and concluded that the people who met at the apartment were NBP members. We shall leave aside the lack of explanation of the methods used to achieve this brilliant scholarly conclusion in the examination brief.
Secondly, even if by some accident the experts are right, the gist of the charges against “the twelve” is nothing but their membership in an organization, which is their right as Russian citizens, provided not only in the Russian Constitution, but also in Article 11 of the Human Rights Convention and Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. While it is true that this organization was deemed extremist by another court, even the prosecution in this case does not claim that the defendants’ actions had any purpose deemed extremist by the law, for example, inciting inter-ethnic hatred or violent or aggressive actions of any kind.
"This case was fabricated to stop our political activities, to stop us from holding rallies at Gostiny Dvor [...] The obvious post-elections revolutionary wave lasted from December [2011] to March [2012.] After March 5th, however, a reactionary wave set in. It is obvious that the election of governors will not be restored; the candidates are filtered and hand-picked by authorities, so these hardly qualify as elections. A number of repressive, anti-extremism laws have been adopted [...] Other trials are being conducted [against the so-called extremists], ours included," explained Andrei Dmitriev, one of the defendants and the head of the St. Petersburg headquarters of The Other Russia movement.
As a matter of fact, their activities amounted to nothing more than meetings and conversations in a kitchen and participating in rallies at Gostiny Dvor in defense of the right of assembly. As for the conversations, even the prosecutor in the case does not conceal his irritation with having to argue that a crime was committed by people discussing politics in a kitchen, to say nothing of the fact that the kitchen was at a specially designated apartment equipped with police-installed video cameras.
There is also a problem with the prosecution’s attempt to use the Gostiny Dvor demonstration as a basis for criminal liability. The rallies were not led by NBP, but by other organizations and groups (the NBP and its symbols are not mentioned in any of the police reports or magistrate rulings), and with the participation of many other people (including celebrities). None of them have been charged with participation in an extremist organization. Moreover, the defendants who did take part in the Strategy-31 demonstrations have already been punished under non-criminal, administrative provisions of the law. The attempt by the prosecution to penalize them a second time violates a well-known universal legal principle: non bis in idem (no one may be punished twice for one and the same action).
Third, the police role in organizing the meetings in the apartment raises the question of whether this was improper entrapment. The entrapment character of police actions is evidenced by an official document included in the case file: a decision to conduct an “experimental operation,” signed by a Ministry of Interior general who serves as chief of the Main Directorate of the Interior Ministry in the Northwestern Federal District. This decision clearly and straightforwardly states that an apartment should be rented in order “to encourage, by artificial means, a large gathering” of NBP members. Based on this, one may ask: isn’t the general himself liable for organizing an extremist association?
Based on the available record of the European Court of Human Rights, including cases originating in Russia, it is absolutely clear that the use of evidence procured as a result of police provocation violates the right each individual has for a just legal procedure, and is therefore unacceptable. Video records obtained as a result of police entrapment should be excluded from the court as unacceptable evidence. The defense has already presented a motion to exclude them.
Thus, the body of evidence against the “St. Petersburg Twelve” amounts to, first, inadmissible video records obtained as a result of police entrapment, and, second, files of administrative proceedings the sentences in which have already been served. It is difficult to say whether under these circumstances Judge Yakovlev will render a guilty verdict. If he does, it will once again show that basic human rights in Russia are violated, in particular, the right to a fair trial. This will distance Russia even further from all the civilized countries where the rule of law is respected and upheld.
