The principal idea that consolidates different parts of Russian society is xenophobia and intolerance to “others.” Such, at least, was the conclusion of a new study on Russia’s “ideological portrait.” IMR Advisor Boris Bruk, who has analyzed the study, is skeptical about predictions of a “fascist” future for Russia.
In May, Ogonek magazine featured an interview with Emil Pain, a professor in the Department of Public and Municipal Services at the Higher School of Economics and a senior academic advisor at the Moscow office of the Kennan Institute. Pain talked about the results of a research project entitled “Russian Ideological Stagnation in the Mirror of Social Media.” The main product of the project is the creation of an “ideological portrait of modern Russia” through an analysis of mass Internet communities and elite groups in the blogosphere. Particular focus was placed on such social media sites as VKontakte, Facebook, and Twitter. The Russian Internet audience is quite extensive, with the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) estimating that some 60 percent of Russians currently use the Internet and 40 percent go online on a daily basis. Experts believe that it is hardly a coincidence that the public attitudes of Internet users are similar to those of the society as a whole, including the so-called “TV party.”
The research shows that Russian society is currently divided into four major political streams or groups, including liberal, leftwing, nationalist, and supporters of the ruling regime. According to the scholars involved in the study, all four groups demonstrate an increased discontent with the state of affairs and in the best-case scenario consider power-holders to be the “lesser of the evils.” In each group, only a very insignificant number of people really believe that things will improve in the near future. Consolidation of each particular group is based on negative factors, which, according to Pain, find their reflection in the assumption that “the present is ugly and the future is hopeless” and a high level of xenophobia. The scholars argue that xenophobia, which is often accompanied by calls for social justice, is the key idea shared by representatives of all four groups. As Pain indicated earlier, “We treat others equally badly—those who come from overseas or a neighboring region” and “if we are friends, we are friends against somebody.”
All social groups demonstrate an increased discontent with the state of affairs and in the best-case scenario consider power-holders to be the “lesser of the evils.”
A similar conclusion was recently drawn by the Levada Center: according to the results of a survey conducted in summer 2012, in response to the question of whether they support the principle “Russia for Russians only,” 41 percent of respondents answered that they do to some degree, and 55 percent answered that they do not. Answering the question of whether residence restrictions should be placed on individuals of particular nationalities, 42 percent of respondents expressed their willingness to see restrictions for natives of the Caucasus, 37 percent wanted to limit the presence of the Chinese, and 35 percent wanted to limit the presence of individuals from the former Soviet Central Asian republics. Only 18 percent of the respondents believed that “no residence restrictions should be placed on individuals of any national origin.” Professor Mark Ustinov of the Higher School of Economics suggests that some 70 percent of Russians have “negative feelings toward people of another ethnicity.”
According to Pain, under current conditions, one of two scenarios may be possible: the Spanish scenario, based on the principle of the Moncloa Pacts, which brought together representatives of major political forces and in many respects paved the way for the transition from Franco's authoritarian system to democracy; and the scenario of the evolution of the Weimar Republic from authoritarianism to dictatorship. Pain does not deny the possibility of the first scenario; however, he believes that the threat posed by the second scenario is quite high and that if no positive changes occur in the society, this scenario could become a reality.
Professor Emil Pain, senior academic advisor at the Moscow office of the Kennan Institute
The “Weimarization” of Russia is not a new topic; in the 1990s, Alexander Yanov called Yeltsin’s Russia “Weimar Russia.” Another example is the article written by Galina Starovoitova entitled “Weimar Russia?” that was published in the Journal of Democracy in 1993. In her article, Starovoitova compared the Weimar Republic of the 1920s (the demise of which marked the beginning of the Third Reich) with post-Soviet Russia, and argued that Russia in the 1990s faced a “danger of an extreme-nationalist revolution.” According to Starovoitova, the country that had triumphed over Nazism did not learn the sad lessons of the past; the fall of communism resulted in the creation of a “spiritual vacuum” that was “rapidly filled by a Russian nationalism” that “spread . . . throughout various strata of society.” The scholars from the Higher School of Economics argue that the main cause of the significant rise of xenophobia in Russia lies in the citizens’ “identity crisis,” which occurred after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In Pain’s words, “Under such circumstances, the ‘discontent’ complex, that is related to social, economic, and political conditions, gets transferred to the image of a clear, visible, close enemy.”
According to Lev Gudkov, director of the Levada Center, in the 2000s, Russian society faced a significant “deficit of development ideas.” With no changes occurring, the deficit was coupled with an increase in public discontent that became especially pronounced in late 2010 and the beginning of 2011. As Gudkov points out, societal tensions were redirected and targeted at “the routine forms of mass hatred for the enemy.” This circle of enemies has included both representatives of other nations and foreigners or outsiders of other kinds. In this context, it should be noted that an important role is played by the media, especially the main television channels, which often make facts appear more horrifying than they are in order to sell their product. As Pain suggests, other traditional enemies include “the unorthodox, Yankees, homosexuals, and feminists.” The wide list of “others” has been continuously expanding. For example, according to Kommersant, VTSIOM data demonstrate that 63 percent of Russians support the initiative to register NGOs that are involved in “political activity” and receive funding from abroad as “foreign agents.” According to the Levada Center, 50 percent of Russian citizens support the idea of holding lawmakers who fail to disclose information about their ownership of real estate in Russia or abroad criminally responsible.
There is practically no unification of Russian society around some kind of shared positive principles and values.
As experts argue, despite citizens’ seeming consolidation around negative attitudes toward a whole range of “others,” there is practically no unification around some kind of shared positive principles and values. On the contrary, the negativity tends to spread to the closest people; the Center for Extremism and Xenophobia of the Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Sciences estimates that individuals’ level of trust for those people closest to them is one of the lowest in Europe.
According to Pain, despite a range of negative factors and trends, the formation of separate streams or groups allows us to talk about the complexity of manipulating the divided Russian society. One might also look at the possibility of the “Weimar” scenario through a skeptical lens. Here, Alexander Yanov’s opinion might be helpful; according to the scholar, “Weimarization” is not happening and fascism is not going to get the upper hand in Russia because of the fact that the ruling regime is “not inspired with the ultranationalist ideology.” The poet Dmitri Bykov similarly argues that fascism is not going to have a sweeping effect: modern Russia, he says, “currently does not even really believe in the multiplication table, let alone ideas.”
