June 6, 2011
Renowned Russian historian Alexander Yanov talks Russian political history and the specifics of its national culture in an exclusive interview with Caterina Innocente.
Caterina Innocente: Why did you first think that Russia is a "broken" Europe?
Alexander Yanov: The first inklings of doubt that there was something wrong with the ideology of Russian prerevolutionary historiography appeared when I was still a student. I had great teachers, they gave us a lot of home reading, and I honestly read it all. I read tons of Russian historians. Russian historians, what a delight—the creme de la creme of the intellectual community. Kluchevsky (the great Russian historian, 1841–1911) was the Pushkin of Russian historiography. These were people of supreme intelligence, and it is a scandal that he was not understood by them. For them, Russia was a late Europe: just one more step and we’d be there. They couldn’t even imagine that Russia could turn around 180 degrees, as was the case in 1917. Only Konstantin Leontiev predicted it.
C.I.: Let’s go back to your theory. Since the time you've been working on the concept that Russia is a "broken" Europe, have there been any changes in the concept?
At first I was having doubts. I wasn't even sure that the concept was correct, because in history everything should be confirmed by facts, and you can't draw conclusions from a single [historical] case—meaning, [the moment in history when] Russia craved substantial liberal changes toward the building of socialism. And at the beginning of the 2000s we saw something that had already happened in our history. Certainly, it cannot be compared to the turning point of 1917; now it's more a farce than a tragedy. But still, it’s like we turned our back on Europe. And here I got the necessary confirmation of my theory: starting from 1987—that is, from Gorbachev's "perestroika"—Russia has again become a "late" Europe. Just remember what hopes there were! And then, all of a sudden, the country abruptly turned backwards.
There was no doubt it was not a coincidence. Then, after 2003, my concept of Russia as a "broken" Europe was finally shaped. In 2003, Khodorkovsky was arrested; Voloshin and Illarionov resigned. A whole series of measures were undertaken to apparently create a monopoly of executive power. And those measures were not subtle; they were open: the threshold for a new party to enter the parliament was raised from 5 percent to 7 percent. Independent candidates were prohibited, as well as party coalitions. The division between branches of power was de facto annulled. Formally, there’s a Duma, but it makes no practical difference, so from a political point of view, it doesn’t exist. And in fact, there’s never been a division between the executive and the judiciary branches. It was impossible not to see all these changes. One had to make theoretical conclusions. So I made them.
The full text of the interview is available on our website in Russian only.
You can read it here>>>
