The leaders of Russia’s opposition are increasingly beholden to the “theory of small deeds,” trying to improve certain aspects of the political and social life. Author and human rights activist Alexander Podrabinek contends that the opposition should aim to dismantle, not improve Russia’s current regime.
This card identifies its holder as a Moscow municipal deputy.
The leaders of Russia’s opposition are increasingly beholden to the “theory of small deeds,” trying to improve certain aspects of the political and social life. Author and human rights activist Alexander Podrabinek contends that the opposition should aim to dismantle, not improve Russia’s current regime.
Hardly anyone would dispute that the efficient organization of the democratic opposition is an important factor in ensuring Russia’s return to democracy. Members of the opposition itself, as well as other people, argue not about this fact but about what is meant by efficient: what immediate and long-term objectives should be and what methods and means should be used to achieve them.
The government takes part in these debates to the best of its ability, although it naturally supports its own side by sometimes indirectly and sometimes openly supporting opponents that it finds acceptable and scheming against unacceptable ones. In order to not get carried away by conspiracy theories or breed bad blood within the opposition, we shall leave out of the conversation the government’s specific actions in this regard. We shall proceed from the assumption that all actions of the opposition are dictated by its own decisions or, in other words, without any external influence.
The array of methods the opposition uses includes everything from the most radical ones, such as unsanctioned street protests, to the most moderate ones, such as polite criticism on state TV channels. It is clear that everyone chooses his or her own level of acrimony and dissent. However, it would be helpful to understand the degree of efficiency characteristic of each level of dissent.
In recent years, the democratic opposition has been generally apathetic. After the democratic leaders’ slightly cowardly behavior in December 2011, when they missed a rare historical opportunity to overthrow the regime by using the opposition’s advantage in numbers to force authoritarianism out of Russian political life, the largest part of the opposition has opted for a relationship with the government based on agreements and arrangements.
Supporters of such delicate pressure on the regime derive consolation from the idea that society is not yet ready to openly oppose the government; concerns about the health and freedom of demonstrators; truisms about the necessity to use all available methods; and, of course, the tired saying that constant dropping wears away a stone. I regret to inform these people that in this particular case, constant dropping does nothing to the stone—first, because there is a limit to the supply of public resentment, and it will all be used up before this dropping succeeds in wearing away anything. Second, the state system is capable of regeneration and bounces back faster than the drops can fall. In order to wear away the block of the current regime, not drops but a powerful water cannon is needed.
As for concerns about the health and freedom of demonstrators, this argument does not sound very convincing. Such concerns are appropriate for relations between parents and their children. Demonstrators, however, are grown-up people, capable of deciding on their own whether they are ready for a confrontation with the government or not. In my opinion, it appears that the opposition itself—not society—is not ready to openly oppose the authoritarian regime. And its hesitations are the same as the cautious behavior that it ascribes to others.
The theory of small deeds is not bad in itself, but it is only appropriate when the system needs to be improved, not changed. In the current situation in Russia, it is more appropriate to speak about the necessity of destroying the system.
There is no doubt that whispering both is safe and gives modest opposition members profound satisfaction. One can mind one’s own store while consoling oneself with the thought of the usefulness of one’s actions. Such actions are indeed useful. There is nothing wrong with the former leader of the Union of Rightist Forces party becoming a regional governor or a leader of the Solidarity movement becoming a member of the regional legislature. There is nothing wrong with people with true democratic beliefs being elected as municipal deputies. These individuals will arrange benches nicely for townspeople, take care of city parks, and prevent historic landmarks from being demolished.
These things obviously should be done. However, the question is not whether doing something is right or not; rather, it concerns the efficiency of actions taken. What change can these actions bring? They can certainly contribute to improving the city landscape in one particular spot, but they cannot change the political system. In order for the system to be changed, the critical mass of positive changes must be large enough—but this critical mass is impossible to achieve, because the system responds to every hard-earned improvement by implementing a dozen initiatives aimed at worsening the situation.
Imagine that you have to boil a pot of water, but instead of an electric or gas stove, you have been given a box of matches and told to strike them one at a time to heat up the pot. You have even been promised more matches when you run out of those you have. The only things you cannot do are make a fire or use a heater, because these methods are considered unsafe for you. You will spend your whole life trying to make water boil by heating it with one match at a time, realizing all the while the futility of your efforts. Nobody will dispute that you are doing the right thing, that you are moving in the right direction by warming water instead of trying to freeze it. But still you will fail, because the pot will lose heat faster than you will be able to heat it up. Even if you invite all your friends to help and you start seeing some progress, the master of the situation will add some cold water to your pot or will stop giving you matches. There goes your efficiency. You cannot change the system by respecting its broad outline.
The opposition should take this into consideration. An imitation of safe opposition activity might be pleasant, but it is pointless. Opposition members have been put in a sandbox and allowed to make sand cakes under the close supervision of a vigilant Chekist preschool teacher. Leaving the sandbox is not recommended. Any movement is considered an attempt at breaking out and will lead to the offending individual being declared a marginal figure. Former playmates will look at the outcast disapprovingly and consider him an impatient smart aleck. Then they will return to their sand cakes, deliberating wisely about the importance of small deeds.
The theory of small deeds is not bad in itself, but it is only appropriate when the system needs to be improved, not changed, when the positive efforts of people driven by enthusiasm outbalance the negatives of the system. In the current situation in Russia, it is more appropriate to speak about the necessity of destroying the system. Hardly anything can be changed at this stage by improving some parts of the system. The situation is deteriorating so quickly that it demands an immediate and appropriate public response, with the key word being “appropriate.” Otherwise, “small deeds” will very soon become rare acts of bravery that only the most courageous people will be able to accomplish.
