The annexation of Crimea was a turning point for Vladimir Putin’s regime. The price of retaining power has increased dramatically, which in practice means that direct repressions will be used against opposition media. However, according to political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya, this trend may prove to be reversible.
On March 12 and 13, two significant events took place in Russia. On March 12, Alexander Mamut, owner of the Afisha-Rambler-SUP joint company, decided to fire Lenta.ru’s legendary chief editor Galina Timchenko. She was replaced by Alexei Goreslavski, former editor of the pro-Kremlin Internet propaganda publication Vzglyad. On March 13, late at night, the Federal Supervision Agency for Information Technologies and Communications (Roskomnadzor) ordered Russian Internet providers to block users’ access to the websites grani.ru, kasparov.ru, ej.ru, and the blog of opposition member Alexei Navalny on the LiveJournal platform. These measures were the direct outcome of the turn taken by Putin’s regime in the context of the “Ukrainian crisis.”
The crisis in Ukraine has become for Russia a sort of “bifurcation point” after which the country began moving in a completely different direction. Russia’s new position will determine the nature of its foreign and domestic policies and seems to be primarily characterized by the strengthening of isolationism, the withdrawal of Russia from the group of “civilized countries,” and an increase in the country’s financial and economic risk in response to the systemic weakness of the Russian economy and the country’s dependency on world energy prices. Russia’s role in the settlement of global problems has weakened as well.
The more closed the system, the less stable it is, which results in the necessity of looking for new mechanisms of retaining control. By annexing Crimea, the Russian elite condemns itself to an inevitable toughening of the political regime: political and media competition become too dangerous in a situation that the Kremlin views as a “pre-war” state.
What does such a toughening mean in practice? In keeping with the Kremlin’s wartime logic, the regime’s reaction to any demonstration of dissent will likely be acute, emotional, and tough, especially with regard to questions that fall in a sort of “red zone,” such as those regarding Ukraine and Crimea and those concerning the country’s reaction to the sanctions imposed by the West. The situation of Lenta.ru is a good example.
Lenta.ru has been one of the most reputable and often-quoted Internet resources since its founding. Galina Timchenko, who has worked for Lenta.ru since its creation in 1999 and has served as editor-in-chief since 2004, is one of the most prominent figures in the media market and enjoys immense respect among her colleagues. The resource itself has considerably strengthened its position, especially in the last two years, not only from the point of view of quality of its work, but also from the point of view of public trust. Lenta.ru’s correspondent Ilya Azar, whose work has involved politically significant journalistic investigations, such as those related to election fraud, is held in particularly high regard by the public. After the announcement of Galina Timchenko’s dismissal, almost the entire website’s editorial staff published a statement claiming that the appointment of Goreslavski in her place constituted “direct pressure on the editor’s offices of Lenta.ru.” It continued: “The dismissal of an independent editor-in-chief and the appointment of a person who can be controlled from outside, including directly from offices in the Kremlin—that is already a violation of the media law.” The majority of Lenta.ru employees submitted their letters of resignation as a mark of protest.
All those who doubt the Kremlin’s actions and whose expressions of concern fall in the “red zone” are seen as enemies of Russia. Anti-liberalism is becoming an almost official ideology of the government.
In the eyes of the regime, Lenta.ru crossed the line by publishing an interview with Andrey Tarasenko, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalist party Right Sector (a link to an interview with Dmitriy Yarosh, another leader of Right Sector was also included in the text). Roskomnadzor used this as a pretext for issuing a warning to Lenta.ru (after three such warnings, the website can be shut down by a court decision). However, this was not enough for the regime. The crucial player in this personnel decision was Alexander Mamut, the main shareholder of Afisha-Rambler-SUP (the company that owns Lenta.ru), who, for purely pragmatic reasons, preferred to secure his business assets against political risks rather than to preserve Lenta.ru in its original state under Timchenko.
“The replacement of a highly qualified professional journalist by the Kremlin’s cynical public relations specialist is an event that, in my opinion, needs no comment. I think the new appointee has already got hit lists ready, according to which he will right away begin squeezing all independent journalists, correspondents, and editors out of the editorial staff,” Anton Nosik, the founder of Lenta.ru, told Newsru.com.
While the media market was still digesting the news about Lenta.ru, another shocking event took place on the very next day: Roskomnadzor ordered Russian providers to restrict access to the online publications grani.ru, kasparov.ru, ej.ru, and the blog of opposition member Alexei Navalny on the LiveJournal platform. The first three online publications were blocked in accordance with a law that allows the blocking of sites that call for unsanctioned acts of protest. Access to Navalny’s blog was banned because the “functioning of this web page” allegedly “violates the provisions of a judicial decision about [Navalny’s] measure of restraint.” The restrictions also affected the website of Echo Moskvy radio, because it had published a blog post written by Navalny on his personal LiveJournal platform. These restrictions constitute the regime’s first test of the law permitting the blocking of sites adopted last December by the State Duma, which came into effect on February 1. At the time of the law’s passage, few believed that the Kremlin would actually block opposition Internet resources.
The situation thus acquired a whole new character: all those who doubt the Kremlin’s actions and whose expressions of concern fall in the “red zone” are seen as enemies of Russia. Anti-liberalism is becoming an almost official ideology of the government. However, this trend has a powerful hand brake: the engagement of the Russian elite in the global economy and the entanglement of the interests of Putin’s close circle in Western countries. In order to continue moving away from democracy, sooner or later, Putin will have to begin protecting his people, which will be a bigger challenge than facing Western sanctions.