Institute of Modern Russia

Participants (panel one):

Mike Abramowitz, President, Freedom House

Vladimir Kara-Murza, Vice Chairman, Open Russia; Chairman, Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom

John Norris, Executive Director, Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative, Center for American Progress

Laura Rosenberger, Director, Alliance for Securing Democracy; Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund

Danielle Pletka (Moderator), Senior Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, AEI

Keynote Speaker:

Senator Ben Sasse (R-NE)

“There is an inseparable connection between the advancement of freedom and basic human flourishing” – Senator Ben Sasse (R-NE)

 

Panel I: Freedom in the World

Pletka: What has caused the backsliding of freedom and democracy we have witnessed over the past 12 years?

Abramowitz:

• Part of the answer lies in the 2008 global financial crisis, which made it more difficult for some democracies to deliver widespread economic prosperity.
• The refugee crisis has also been to blame – mass migration has disrupted politics, and catalyzed the rise of populism.
• Part of the answer also lies with the increasingly aggressive Chinese and Russian governments, which have aimed to challenge the U.S.-led liberal international order.
• It may also be due to a U.S. retreat from the world stage in the wake of the failures of the Iraq War.

Rosenberger:

• Whereas during the Arab Spring, commentators believed that technology would act solely as a force for good – i.e. freedom and democracy – Russian disinformation has proven that this is not necessarily the case.
• Putin and Xi Jinping are eroding democracy abroad to consolidate weak holds on power at home. 

Norris:

• Economic crises are largely to blame for the unleashing of populist political forces in recent years.
• Russia and China are acting aggressively abroad and repressing dissent at home not because their governments are strong, but because they are weak.

Kara-Murza:

• Strong governments don’t need to repress or imprison their citizens.
• The recent mass protests that took place in Russia are not a good sign for an aging authoritarian like Putin.

 

Pletka: Is Vladimir Putin a product or an influencer of the illiberal trend we have seen around the world?

Kara-Murza:

• Putin transformed Russia into an autocratic country slowly, but very deliberately, and this process began from the very first day he assumed the presidency on December 31st, 1999.
• 2003 was also a key year in terms of Putin’s consolidation of power:
• The Kremlin shut down the country’s last independent TV channel.
• Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested for his political disobedience.
• 2003 also marked the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union that international election observers considered an election in Russia to be neither “free” nor “fair.”
• Putin is only “popular” because he has never been tested in a free and fair election.
• There were two candidates who once posed a potential challenge to Vladimir Putin’s hold over Russia: Boris Nemtsov and Alexei Navalny.
• Nemtsov was killed virtually in front of the Kremlin in 2015; Navalny was recently disqualified from running by the Russian authorities.

 

Pletka: Why have American youth recently demonstrated more negative attitudes toward democracy?

Rosenberger:

• With no historical memory of life under alternative, more repressive political systems, youth tend to treat democracy as an “invisible good.”
• Russia and China are not creating rifts in American society – they are exploiting preexisting ones.

Abramowitz:

• The White House’s messaging on repressive dictatorships has not been aggressive enough – and this is certainly not doing much to alleviate Americans’ increasingly negative attitudes toward democracy.

Norris:

• The Trump administration’s rhetoric has proven less supportive of democracy and human rights than that of its predecessors. 

Kara-Murza:

• Democracy and human rights should not be held to the whims of bipartisan politics.
• The U.S. Congress has realized this; a number of U.S. presidents, however – from George W. Bush to Trump – have proven too soft with Putin.

 

Q & A: Sometimes opposition movements soften their views to mollify the government and improve their chances of political survival. To what extent does this erode democracy?

Norris:

• Opposition movements around the world often underestimate how far their opponents are willing to go to ensure their long-term repression, and the need to put aside petty differences and unify collectively against the government.

Kara-Murza:

• Russia’s current political system bears a lot of resemblance to the German Democratic Republic of the Cold War; more than one political party exists, but they are all more or less controlled by the powers that be.
• Russia’s genuine opposition is either not allowed on the ballot, or is repressed, exiled, or threatened with violence; it can only express its views through street protests.
• It is ironic that Kremlin officials accuse Russian democracy activists of meeting with Western officials to help effect regime change; they do nothing of the sort, while the Kremlin-aligned officials and cronies themselves steal from Russia and spend in the West.
• We merely ask our Western counterparts to not enable this behavior.

 

You can watch full video of the event here.