In this week’s Western media highlights, Thomas Graham criticizes in the National Interest existing attitudes in Washington regarding the U.S.-Russia relationship and suggests policymakers develop a new grand strategy for Russia. In the American Interest, Andrew Foxall dissects the Kremlin’s recent attempts to manipulate history to justify its policies. Meanwhile, in the Russian media, Vladimir Inozemtsev provides his plan for economic reform in Russia, and Alexander Auzan argues that the country’s democratic transition can only be successful if the public and elites reach consensus on the terms of the much-needed change.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry seen in Vienna ahead of talks with Russia's foreign minister Sergei Lavrov. Photo: Valery Sharifulin / TASS
From the West
America Needs to Break Old Habits on Russia
Thomas Graham, The National Interest
Thomas Graham, managing director at Kissinger Associates, argues that the United States needs to develop a new grand strategy for Russia. The mistake of the post-Cold War strategy was that the project of Russia’s transformation into a free-market democracy was put in the hands of the country’s leaders, whose interests essentially differed from those of the U.S. Graham emphasizes that Russia’s goal today is to reassert its influence in the former Soviet space, but in order to succeed, it must restore its historical dynamism, a task that will be difficult to accomplish given the current structure of power, which “impedes the unleashing of the country’s creative energies.” In order to formulate a new grand strategy, the U.S. must reflect on the differing roles Russia plays in various regions and design policy based on “a hard calculation of national interests.” It is important, Graham claims, that the U.S. not fall prey to extreme approaches that view Russia either as a top geopolitical threat or as a country that no longer matters. U.S.-Russia relations must be a mix of both competition and cooperation, resistance and accommodation. Graham acknowledges, however, that it will be a challenge for policymakers to craft a coherent policy given the current existence of various approaches to Russia on discrete issues.
Why the U.S. Needs Russian Rocket Engines to Spy on Russia
Eli Lake, Bloomberg View
Eli Lake, a Bloomberg View columnist, writes about the puzzle the U.S. faces due to its reliance on Russian rocket engines—a reliance that undermines sanctions levied against Russia for its 2014 invasion of Ukraine. While senator John McCain proposes to phase out American dependence on Russian engines, other senators—Richard Shelby (R-AL), and Richard Durbin, (D-IL)—push for an amendment that would let the U.S. purchase twice the number of engines called for by McCain. Lake notes that it all started in 1996 when president Bill Clinton began permitting the use of Russian rockets for commercial space launches and later for national security missions. According to the initial plan, the Pentagon would have started using exclusively American rocket engines by 2000. That deadline was pushed back because of the costs associated with engine production in the U.S. The use of Russian engines, however, has recently become problematic, because “the U.S. purchase of Russian rockets is enriching two senior Russian officials, Dmitry Rogozin and Sergei Chemezov,” both on the official sanctions list. According to Lake, the situation with Russian rocket engines suggests that many Republicans and Democrats were perhaps too optimistic in assuming that “partnerships with aggressive states would tame them over time.”
In Putin’s Russia, History Is Subversive
Andrew Foxall, The American Interest
Andrew Foxall, director of the Russia Studies Centre at the Henry Jackson Society, discusses how the Kremlin manipulates history and controls Russia’s collective memory in order to consolidate society around the regime and justify the foreign policy it’s been pursuing. To illustrate his point, he uses the case of Sergei Mironenko, who was dismissed from his position as director of the Russian State Archive. Mironenko fell out of favor when the archive released correspondence between Soviet officials from 1948 that undermined the popular legend of the heroism of “Panfilov’s 28 Guardsmen” during the Second World War. According to Foxall, since 2000, the Kremlin has been cultivating myths of past glory and heroism, arguing that the Soviet Union was “solely responsible for defeating Nazism and defending Europe,” and obstructing Russian citizens from questioning official narratives. The Kremlin also implemented a number of policies enabling the regime to revise and rewrite history—Putin’s initiative to create standardized history textbooks, which means teaching the “state-approved version of history” only, being one of them. Foxall ends by outlining steps the West could take to counter Putin’s use of history. He suggests the West support research in the Russian and Soviet Archives and promote educational programs intended to disclose the Kremlin’s attempts to manipulate history.
From Russia
Parameters of the Third Way
Vladislav Inozemtsev, Vedomosti
Vladislav Inozemtsev, visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, reviews two programs of Russian economic reform outlined by groups of economists at the request of President Putin. The first program (“Glazyev’s strategy) calls for tougher “manual control” of the government and restrictions of market mechanisms, while the second (“Kudrin’s strategy”) focuses on reviving entrepreneurship, limiting the powers of officials, and revising the “autarky” policy, among other things. Inozemtsev concludes that both programs could be seen as too radical and that a third, more moderate program is necessary. His idea is to launch slow-paced, partial reforms aimed primarily at helping the economy overcome recession. Inzomtsev offers five steps to start: sharply decrease taxes on small and mid-sized businesses and ease up administrative pressure; develop industries that would be fully tax-free (focusing on agriculture); reform the value-added tax system to improve the status-quo in the manufacturing industries; introduce a tough rate regulation of natural industries; and reconsider the current discussion on pension system reform and start not by increasing the retirement age but by cancelling wage-payments for working pensioners.
Rüdiger von Fritsch: Both Sides Must Fulfill Minsk Accords Obligations
Dmitry Muratov, Novaya Gazeta
German ambassador to Russia Rüdiger von Fritsch speaks to Novaya Gazeta about obstacles impeding implementation of the Minsk Accords between Ukraine and Russia. Russia, he says, argues that it can’t entirely fulfill its obligations until the Ukrainian parliament passes the bills on holding local elections in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics and establishing their status. Another Russian concern had been that in the current “Normandy format” (which includes Germany and France as mediators in the negotiations) does not represent the interests of pro-Russian separatists; however, this concern was resolved, at least for now, when Moscow was permitted to represent those interests itself. As for Kiev’s stance, it accused Russia of not pulling its troops from Eastern Ukraine, while continually allowing separatists to violate the ceasefire agreement. The ambassador also points out that Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada, which views the separatists as “gangsters,” is repelled by the possibility that all participants in the conflict may get amnesty. Finally, von Fritsch notes that both Kiev and Moscow are stalling the peace process, though officially they’re not abandoning the Minsk Accords—an agreement that doesn’t have any alternatives. Despite these issues, the German diplomat remains optimistic, arguing that Germany and France “constantly see opportunities to move forward” and that the two countries will continue “searching for new ways [for the Minsk Accords] to be implemented.”
Alexander Auzan: A Cognitive Dissonance Has Emerged in Russia
Olga Kuvshinova, Vedomosti
In his longread interview for Vedomosti, Alexander Auzan, dean of the economics department at Moscow State University, discusses Russia’s so-called “path problem” and points to the dilemma facing the country’s government today: either increase GDP growth rates (a short-term solution) or conduct structural reforms (a long-term one). According to Auzan, before democratic transition can be initiated in Russia, other, more crucial problems must first be solved, such as poor economic institutions, dysfunctional court system, and the absence of the rule of law. For that to happen, he argues, a shift in values needs to occur in the public mindset and among elites. “First, you need a long-term vision, and only then can you talk about inclusive institutions,” Auzan says. The elites have to find a consensus, and, as he suggests, the common goal of finding acceptable ways to split political and business interests could be a possibility. As for the public, it can find common ground in fixing overarching national problems, such as education, healthcare, and the pension system. Auzan underscores that Russians are approaching an understanding that serious change is needed: they can call Russia a “great power” as much as they want, but when the country is held back by a weak, primitive economy, a cognitive dissonance develops.
Nini Arshakuni helped compile this week's roundup.
