Institute of Modern Russia

From the West

A Modest Deal: Vladimir Putin’s New Détente

Vladimir Frolov, The Moscow Times

In his piece for the Moscow Times, political analyst Vladimir Frolov discusses Vladimir Putin’s recent emphasis on Russia’s willingness to engage in “close cooperation with the United States on international affairs.” It seems that Moscow has gone into “deconfliction mode” after almost two and a half years of military and diplomatic tensions with the West. Previously, at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Putin referred to the U.S. as “the only superpower” and highlighted Moscow’s interest in working with it. Putin also agreed to hold a meeting of the Russia-NATO Council after NATO’s Warsaw summit this week. Moscow’s intention, according to Frolov, is to “normalize the relations [it] views as going back to pre-Crimea” without giving up control over Ukraine. Despite the fact that Moscow’s confrontation with the West over its intervention in Ukraine boosted Putin’s approval ratings, the costs have been high “in terms of Western economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and a ruined relationship with a close neighbor.” The West refused to recognize Russia’s self-claimed spheres of influence, and NATO responded to Moscow’s “irresponsible saber-rattling” with plans for additional troop deployments in Eastern Europe. According to Frolov, Russia’s military exploits in Syria in 2015 succeeded in breaking the country out of isolation and putting it on a par with the U.S. However, as of today, Moscow is still stuck in Syria, looking for a “political exit to declare victory and go home”—something it can achieve only through cooperation with the U.S., Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.

The Russia Paradox: How To Deal with an Aggressive Yet Weak Power

Wolfgang Ischinger, Der Spiegel

Wolfgang Ischinger, a German diplomat and chairman of the Munich Security Conference, discusses what he calls the “somewhat paradoxical approach” toward Russia the West must take. Despite Russia’s unwillingness to engage in constructive dialogue, the West should try to be cooperative, transparent, and “strategically patient,” according to Ischinger. The West must pursue the classic “double-track strategy”—bolstering NATO’s defense capabilities on the one hand, because the risk of escalation is high, and promoting dialogue and cooperative engagement with Russia on the other. The author argues that it is important to signal to the Russian people that the U.S. seeks “an open relationship instead of confrontation.” He suggests offering visa-free travel to Russians, and increasing the number of scholarships and exchange programs for Russian students and academics. It is also important to “go back to diplomacy,” update the fundamental principles of the Helsinki Accords, and provide transparency about NATO’s intentions. The West must base its reactions on a clear analysis of Russian power. Despite its military prowess, Russia is relatively weak, both politically and economically. In its assessment of the situation, the West needs to be self-critical too, and remember that, for instance, one of two key pillars of NATO’s policy—building a relationship with Russia—has been ignored, while the other—enlargement of the alliance—has been actively and successfully pursued. In order to prevent a new dividing line through Europe, Ischinger writes, the West must consider Russia a Euro-Atlantic partner. Only “strategic patience” can meet the challenge currently posed by the Kremlin.

Russia Is Not Dying From a Brain Drain

Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg View

Leonid Bershidsky, a Bloomberg View columnist, touches on the widely discussed issue of a “brain drain” in Russia, and argues that most of the analyses have been wrong. It has been suggested that 350,000 people emigrated from Russia in 2015—ten times more than five years ago—and that this emigration correlates with Putin’s domestic and foreign politics. Bershidsky goes deeper into the statistics and emphasizes that of the 350,000 people who emigrated, 299,000 went to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This looks more like migrant workers returning home than a “brain drain.” There is also a flow in the opposite direction: 536,157 people immigrated to Russia in 2015; about 4,000 came from Germany alone. The author does not deny that emigration has been on the rise during Putin’s third term; however, most people did not move to wealthier countries—a natural destination for the best and brightest. And, even if most émigrés represent the “creative class,” Bershidsky argues, “Russia is not going to shut down without us,” given that the flow goes in both directions. According to Bershidsky, Russia has a different human resources problem, one that lies in rapidly declining education quality. The country is losing its creative potential because less and less money is being spent on education and job training, resulting in millions of people with useless degrees, unable to compete in an international market.

From Russia

A Hole Where Ethics Should Be: What’s Wrong with Russia’s Value System

Andrei Arkhangelsky, Carnegie.ru

Journalist Andrei Arkhanguelsky discusses a central concept for any society, one that Russia lacks nowadays—ethics. In the early ’90s, as the Soviet Union collapsed, so did its authoritarian ethics that mostly taught “not how to live but how to die.” But a new, humanistic ethics did not emerge in its place as the builders of the Russian capitalism expected. Instead, public reaction to this enormous trauma yielded various forms of ethics: criminal ethics, regional ethics (that predetermined the rise of nationalism), anti-ethics and its subtypes, such as Stalin ethics and war ethics. Based on these, in the early 2000s, an official doctrine of the new ethics was formed, one that denied foreign values and declared that there is no line between good and evil: “ultimately, everything is word-play and decay.” In recent years, this doctrine has transformed into a hybrid ethics—a mixture of authoritarian and negative ethics: “when it’s convenient, [officials use] Soviet ethics (we are always right), and when it’s needed—[they switch to] negative ethics (everyone is equally bad).” According to the author, due to propaganda efforts, a moral catastrophe has occurred in Russia—massive dehumanization. Humanist ethics that rely, first and foremost, on dialogue and communication, start with asking questions. They suggest articulating a problem and then working toward conscious reconciliation and forgiveness.

The Austerity of Judgment Day: What Freezing Budget Expenditures Will Lead To

Pyotr Rushailo, Forbes Russia

Last week it was reported that Russia’s Finance Ministry is planning to freeze federal budget expenditures at a level of 15.78 trillion rubles ($246 billions) for three years. Financial journalist Peter Rushailo says the logic behind the ministry’s decision is understandable: the budget is deficit-plagued, and with the current rate of spending, the Reserve Fund might be exhausted before the end of 2017; therefore one must keep up with one’s means. However, he observes, the country’s budget is not a family budget for which one needs to balance debit and credit; it may be “the most powerful tool of the government’s economic policy.” The Finance Ministry’s proposal means the government must abandon this tool, leaving it little room to maneuver. Under these conditions, along with a parliament that has become known as “a mad printer,” the country is likely to end up with “a dumb calculator” in the Russian White House.

Conditional Selectiveness: Why Shuvalov is Allowed What Others Are Not

Tatiana Stanovaya, Slon.ru

This week Aleksei Navalny published a new investigation that revealed that Russian deputy prime minister Igor Shuvalov owns 14 apartments in a prestigious Stalin-era high-rise in Moscow. Political commentator Tatiana Stanovaya writes that Putin’s regime has bred two types of officials—“aristocrats of the sword” who hide their wealth from the people, and “aristocrats of the cloak” (Shuvalov being one of them) who have worked hard to make sure all their income is legalized. According to Stanovaya, Shuvalov is marked by his ambitions for aristocracy, class privileges, and, consequently, public acceptance of such status and legitimacy. In Russia, where the Basic Law has been reduced to the will of Vladimir Putin, good faith in front of the people has been turned into loyalty to Putin. “Making money is allowed, but one needs to maintain appearances” is an unwritten rule determined by Putin himself. Against this backdrop, one cannot help but compare Shuvalov’s case to the arrest of Nikita Belykh: the difference is the degree to which the official was integrated into Putin’s system. Belykh, like many other governors, is marginal to the system and thus dispensable, while Shuvalov appears to be a valuable element that the system’s stability depends on.

Nini Arshakuni helped compile this week's roundup.