The Cuban Missile Crisis, which put the world on the brink of a nuclear war, officially ended on October 28th, 1962, after a compromise was reached between U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. A half-century later, international affairs experts are reflecting on the lessons of the superpower conflict – and drawing parallels with the current situation in Iran.
In October 1962, newspapers on both sides of the "Iron Curtain" were warning of a coming nuclear confrontation.
At 9 a.m. on October 16th, 1962, photographs that clearly indicated the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba were placed on President John F. Kennedy’s desk. This was the beginning of “the most dangerous thirteen days in the history of the humankind”, in the words of Ted Sorensen, a speechwriter and close advisor to JFK. For thirteen days the world was on the brink of catastrophe.
In 1986, The National Interest published an article “Why We Should Stop Studying the Cuban Missile Crisis” by Eliot Cohen, who argued that since 1962 researchers and politicians have relied too much on the lessons of that crisis as guidance for decisions in other situations. Is it worthwhile to continue studying the Cuban Missile Crisis? What are its key lessons? The participants in a panel 50 Years Later: Re-examining the Cuban Missile Crisis organized by the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and the Harriman Institute at Columbia University tried to answer these and other related questions.
The panelists included Fred Kempe, President of the Atlantic Council, Nina Khrushcheva, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the New School (and a granddaughter of Nikita Khrushchev), Timothy Naftali, Senior Research Fellow at the New America Foundation; the discussants were Richard Betts, Director of Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics, and Kimberly Marten, Acting Director of the Harriman Institute.
Nina Khrushcheva believes that U.S. President John F. Kennedy in some ways reminded her great-grandfather of his own late son (on left: Fred Kempe, on right: Timothy Naftali).
According to Richard Betts, despite the fact that 50 years have passed since the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it remains an important subject: scholars continue to discover new details that help to analyze the different versions of the origins and development of the crisis. Fred Kempe pointed out that the majority of studies on the Cuban Missile Crisis focused just on Cuba, and neglected the importance of the tensions between the USSR and the United States over the Berlin Wall that had been built just fourteen months earlier. He believes that Khrushchev’s decision to deploy missiles in Cuba was by no means a “reckless act,” but was the result of a “calculated risk” and, to a significant extent, was based on the Soviet leader’s observations of the American president as a politician and a person. In Khrushchev’s eyes, Kennedy, from the very beginning of his term, demonstrated indecisiveness and weakness, as evidenced by the president’s handling of the Berlin situation. The Soviet leader thus believed that Kennedy’s agenda was limited to maintaining the fragile status-quo and, at that time, was certain that JFK would do everything to avoid nuclear war and would eventually agree to Soviet missile deployment in Cuba. Khrushchev thought that this would, above all else, resolve the Berlin question.
Khrushchev was certain that JFK would eventually agree to Soviet missile deployment in Cuba.
Nina Khrushcheva noted another potential motivation for placing Soviet missiles in Cuba. In her opinion, the question of the balance of power was crucial for the Soviet leader: he believed that, “since Americans had missiles in Turkey, the USSR must deploy missiles in the Western hemisphere.” For almost two weeks it seemed that nothing would prevent war between the two countries. At some point, however, a “human link” was established between the Soviet leader and the American president who, in some ways, reminded Khrushchev of his late son Leonid (who had been killed in the Second World War).
Timothy Naftali presented the audience with findings from his 1997 archival research, which, in part, had been conducted in Russia (before Vladimir Putin, who came to power in 1999, started restricting access to Russian archives). According to the scholar, Kennedy was a strong leader who persistently defended U.S. interests and sought to show the USSR “how tough he was” in regard to the critical issues. At the same time, President Kennedy made every effort to avoid confrontation. In his turn, Khrushchev, facing major geopolitical challenges (Berlin, South-East Asia), was “fearful” of a confrontation with the powerful U.S. military machine. Naftali suggests that, in certain respects, Khrushchev weakened the USSR by pursuing a course aimed at solving political and economic issues, and giving less attention to military matters. Because he recognized the Soviet Union’s military inferiority to the United States, Khrushchev planned the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba in absolute secrecy.
In summarizing the discussion, Robert Jervis pointed out that there is no simple interpretation of the events related to the Cuban Missile Crisis, and that on many issues there are different interpretations and matters of debate – both because it is possible to view the historical evidence from different perspectives, and because important information is still missing. As Richard Betts indicated, “We find ourselves still learning about the Cuban Missile Crisis.”
According to the panel’s experts, the present-day Iranian situation could become as tense as the events of 1962. In the words of Graham Allison of Harvard University, confrontation with Iran is the Cuban Missile Crisis “in slow motion.” While 50 years ago the crisis involved two superpowers, the present confrontation involves three countries – the United States, Israel, and Iran – which makes finding a solution even more challenging.
