June 25 marked the first day of the constitutional plebiscite in Russia, which will last until July 1. Apart from the keenly discussed amendments to the Russian constitution that will allow Vladimir Putin to stay in power until at least 2036, a less noticed, but still crucial change has been introduced—codifying the status of Russian as the language of a state-forming nation.
Before the COVID-19 pandemic swept across Russia, the Kremlin was planning to hold a referendum on constitutional reforms that would allow Vladimir Putin to stay in power until 2036. The vote will now take place in late June. The move signals that Putin remains invested in the legitimacy of popular approval, and the best possible outcome of the vote is likely to be produced now.
An attempted merger of the Arkhangelsk Region and the Nenets Autonomous District in Russia’s north has reignited debates about territorial reforms in the country. An examination of previous attempts in 2003-2008 shows that the government has not learned its lesson, which threatens to elevate the risks in regional politics.
Bloomberg recently estimated that Russia’s economy may contract by 16 percent in the second quarter of 2020. According to Russian analysts, its GDP declined by about 28 percent in April. Still, despite the unfolding economic crisis, there is no reason to believe that it will lead to political change.
Dr. Gregory Asmolov explains how the Russian Internet—Runet—emerged as a socio-cultural and political free space and became a target for the Kremlin after the mass protests of 2011-2012. In this interview for IMR, political scientist Yana Gorokhovskaia spoke with Asmolov about digital innovation in Russia, state encroachment, and the Runet’s role during the COVID-19 pandemic.
A survey produced by an obscure pro-Kremlin website recently sparked global debate about the Kremlin’s potentially abandoning Syrian President Bashar Assad, a long-time Russian ally in the Middle East. While Moscow is indeed increasingly unhappy with Assad, there is little indication that Vladimir Putin has changed his game in the region.
Last week, Vladimir Putin’s approval rating dropped to 59 percent—its lowest ever level. Some observers attributed this decline to Putin’s handling of the ongoing coronavirus crisis. But Yana Gorokhovskaia argues that when it comes to approval ratings, perception of the president’s performance matters more than facts.
For over 10 years, the Institute of Modern Russia has been working to raise awareness in the West about critical issues of the Russian politics under Vladimir Putin. Today, amidst the global crisis, we turn to our readers for support.
The COVID-19 pandemic hit Russia hard, with Moscow emerging as the epicenter and regions expected to reach peak numbers in the coming weeks. From the onset of the crisis, Vladimir Putin has delegated full responsibility for its management to regional governments in what might look like a sudden break with his centralized approach. However, regions have not been given real power, but rather left to their own devices with little guidance from the Kremlin.
Recently, Belarus emerged on the US international agenda as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Minsk to meet President Alexander Lukashenko in what was the first such high profile encounter between the two countries in 26 years. The visit alarmed Moscow, which has long been nursing a plan to absorb Belarus as part of the Union State. Minsk’s latest feud with the Kremlin showcases Lukashenko’s ability to successfully manipulate geopolitical differences between Russia and the West, and to extract surprising concessions from its significantly more powerful neighbor.
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