Institute of Modern Russia

It feels like almost no time has passed since Viktor Tsoi performed “Change,” in the closing credits of popular film Assa and the song became a  perestroika anthem. In fact, a quarter of a century has passed since then. In recent times, it has started to seem like that same desire for change has returned to Russia. Today, many people are once again demanding change in Russia, this time seeking escape from the swamp of Putin's "stability."

There is, of course, nothing wrong with wanting stability. For centuries, Russians were reluctant to wish for a new Tsar , assuming that any new Tsar would be worse than the old one. The importance of maintaining stability became an integral part of the Russian mentality and historically, the political elite has exploited this fact. Following in this tradition, Vladimir Putin is known as the protector of a stability that is supposedly being constantly threatened by enemies from outside and from within.

Stability and stagnation are not the same thing, and Russians understand that. Despite their seeming detachment from all things political, Russians also understand that the rulers performing their self-serving plays in the political arena relegate society at large to the role of the credulous spectator. It seems that this kind of relationship between the government and the Russian people has run its course. Russian society has changed, and it now wants—and deserves—real change for the better. But is change possible in the thick of today’s stagnation?

In a recent Profile magazine editorial, journalist Dmitrii Bykov suggested that Russian political life is exciting “primarily because it is so unpredictable.” In 2011, Mikhail Dmitriev, President of Moscow think tank the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) and his colleagues took some of the excitement out of Russian politics with a study that predicted the 2011-2012 political crisis and the mass protests that followed. CSR experts foresaw all of this occurring due to a failure of public trust in government. For this reason, the new report from CSR and the “prophet of Russian protest,” which was commissioned by former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin’s new NGO, the Committee of Civil Initiatives, caused a media frenzy.

The report, released this past May and called “Society and the Government During Political Crisis,” asserts that a “uniform and pragmatic demand for change” is prevalent in Russian society today. To a significant extent, this demand has emerged in response to the acute and irreversible crisis in all spheres of Russian public and political life. According to the report, which is largely based on data collected from focus groups, “it is [currently] impossible to maintain political stability or return to the pre-crisis status quo.”

The new CSR study showed that discontent with the “deteriorating” (in the words of report co-author Sergey Belanovsky) and largely worn-out regime has been steadily increasing.

 

 

Two of the report's authors, Sergei Belanovsky (right) and Mikhail Dmitriev (left). In a recent Vedomosti article, CSR analysts wrote that, “In May and June [of 2012], the government made one mistake after another, acting as though they had an inexhaustible supply of public trust at their disposal. [...] However, harsher anti-protest measures, including arrests and searches targeting opposition leaders, generated the reverse of what authorities desired. Despite rain and the fact that it fell on a national holiday, the final protest rally of the season became one of the largest yet.”

 

Public trust in government, the existing political parties, and key political figures is currently very low, official estimates notwithstanding. On one hand, according to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTSIOM), 65% of respondents say they still trust Vladimir Putin. On the other hand, CSR focus groups provided a deeper look at the issue: their results suggested that the high level of support for the President is primarily based on the fact that many Russians do not see a viable alternative to Putin and, in order to reduce cognitive dissonance, falsely ascribe a number of positive qualities to him. The reality is that the President does not have many genuine loyal supporters. In fact, Russian polling agency the Levada Center has come to a similar conclusion: according to their recent reports, "Putin’s positive image is fading steadily and irreversibly."

None of this changes the fact that a clear alternative has yet to emerge. The question of what party could replace United Russia still stands, while UR lacks public support and is increasingly found to be the source of public ire. CSR experts believe that the potential for building a new majority party exists under present conditions. People are obviously tired of seeing the same old faces among the political elite. Many of today's leading political figure are perceived as obsolete. Who do Russian have to choose from? Mikhail Prokhorov? Dmitry Rogozin? Alexei Kudrin? Or the new, ‘different’ leaders: Alexei Navalny? Sergei Udaltsov? Evgeny Roizman?

The CSR study illustrates public’s ambivalence about all of current political leaders. Billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov has some middle class support, but many respondents believe that he “has already stolen from everyone.” Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin has won over some supporters with his anti-Western rhetoric, but is not considered capable of formulating a comprehensive political agenda.

Alexei Kudrin isn’t perceived as a political leader, either. His image, however, “is unique and incomparable to other candidates,” due to his experience as a public official and his expertise in economics. According to the CSR report, Kudrin is primarily perceived as an expert in his field, rather than a proponent of the liberal agenda, which would allow him to garner the support of many different segments of the electorate. 

Opposition leaders also evoke mixed feelings. Alexey Navalny is still relatively little-known, inexperienced in government, and his “abstract” anti-corruption rhetoric does not appeal to the Russian mainstream. Nonetheless, the focus group data showed that Navalny potential as a political leader is not to be underestimates, as he has become “the clear favorite among other prospective leaders.” Sergei Udaltsov is also seen as a leader, but his somewhat aggressive image “scares some away.” Evgeny Roizman was characterized as a man who is “actually doing something real,” but for the most part, Roizman is not considered a politician and is thought by some to have ties to the criminal world.

Much of this discussion is reminiscent of Nikolai Gogol’s Marriage: “If I could only put Nikanor Ivanovich's lips with Ivan Kuzmich's nose …” That said, Russians still have to choose a new leader. As the CSR report shows, society at large has matured, has the capacity for “rational thought,” and has become “pragmatic and realistic.” Russians want concrete result, first and foremost they want the government to provide the basic services it is responsible for. In addition, many middle-class Muscovites are interested in resolving rule-of-law-related issues.

The majority of Russians do not seek out confrontation with the authorities. According to Maria Lipman of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, Russians are “not ready to invest in change.” Although active protesters only comprise a small portion of the population, opposition rallies “have had and will continue to have a decisive influence on the development of the political crisis.” CSR report authors conclude that there is the high probability of the situation playing out along either the “political reaction” or “radical transformation” scenarios. The political reaction scenario entails the escalation into a violent confrontation between the protesters and the government; the radical transformation scenario could come about as the result of the combination of economic and political crisis that leads to “chaotic” changes in government.

Interestingly, for a number of political leaders and analysts, the report’s findings did not break new ground. In an interview with Rosbalt, long-time opposition leader Boris Nemtsov said that it was perfectly clear that the country is facing a real, irreversible crisis, which has been exacerbated by the impossibility of the opposition establishing a dialogue with the government. Similarly, Sergey Udaltsov believes that Russia is in a crisis that has escalated very quickly. According to writer Eduard Limonov, the situation will get worse and the crisis will become irreversible if authorities resort to tougher measures against the protesters.

A number of independent experts expressed similar opinions. Teodor Shanin, sociology professor at Manchester University, recently told Ekho Moskvy that the political reaction scenario seems likely and tougher measures on the part of the authorities would only make things worse. Olga Kryshtanovskaya, head of the Center for Elite Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, said that “reactionary forces are gaining strength, and there is an overall push toward radicalization. Indeed, the situation might become violent.”

Political analyst Alexander Nagorny and Gleb Musikhin, a professor at the Department of Applied Political Science of the Higher School of Economics, both take a more moderate position. In an interview with website Mnenia.ru, Alexander Nagorny suggested that one of the radical scenarios is possible but would not occur anytime soon. Gleb Musikhin believes that a systemic crisis may become a reality, but would be caused by the alienation of both the opposition and the Russian mainstream from the authorities.

The CSR report was received extensive media coverage. A number of major news outlets, including Novaya Gazeta, Vedomosti, and Ogonek presented key points from the report. Russian news and information agency RIA Novosti and the Russian edition of Forbes published excerpts. Following release of the report, several magazines, including the Profile and the New Times, sought to extend the discussion of the CSR study, publishing exclusive interviews with Mikhail Dmitriev. The CSR report did not go unnoticed by other media outlets, including Radio Svoboda, Ekho Moskvy, FINAM FM, and Expert TV.

Analyzing the findings of the CSR study, Argumenti Nedeli [Topics of the Week] featured an article called “Forward to the Past! To 1905?”, that drew a rather pessimistic picture of future developments. In addition to the analysis, the article quoted Dmitriev comparing the situation in present-day Russia to the revolutionary foment of 1905. Similarly sensational was Forbes article “Even Their Achievements Will No Longer Help Putin and Medvedev,” which argued that the future most likely holds both political and economic crises.

However, not everyone has taken the CSR’s prognoses seriously. According to “No Drama, Please,” which appeared in Gazeta.Ru, radical scenarios are highly unlikely to play out in the foreseeable future due to the absence of a critical mass of people “capable of self-organization, committed to regular political and civic engagement, and understanding their class interests.” Newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda compared the report with the horror stories of pre-revolutionary author Leonid Andreyev. The author of the latter article went on to say that in many ways, the report panders to Alexei Kudrin, whose organization commissioned it.

 

Last April former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin co-founded the Committee for Civil Initiatives, an NGO aimed at developing institutions of civil society and helping Russian citizens, citizens' groups, other NGOs, and professionals find ways to participate in civil society. However, according to journalist and opposition figure Yuri Saprykin, the concept behind the committee, which seems to be "fighting for all that is good and against everything bad," remains vague.

 

A number of other publications made the connection between the CSR report and Kudrin’s interests. For instance, Lenta.ru ran an article called “Kudrin’s Propaganda”, suggesting that the CSR report was written to please Kudrin. In “Kudrin the Professional”, which appeared in the Profile, there is a caricature of the Head of the Committee of Civil Initiatives happily reading the new CSR report, smiling widely as he sees the words about his uniqueness. In an interview with Ogonyok, Mikhail Dmitriev addressed these accusations stating that report authors had no intention of skewing their results in Kudrin’s favor.

Regardless, in the current situation, it seems less important to take note of who is pandering to whom than to see the clear, tangible evidence of a true political crisis as it is presented in the CSR report. Public opinion is in flux, discontent is growing among all levels of society and there is little support for key political players. New forces have emerged on the political arena, and all of these factors should influence the lawmakers’ behavior. The new rules of the game should affect not only those in charge, but also the public that has remained disconnected from any kind of real political power for too long. The question is whether Russian authorities are ready for the electorate to participate in the country’s political life.

No crisis is purely negative. Even the most seemingly hopeless situations create opportunities that can be better pursued in light of previous negative experience. During the present stage of the crisis, the country must take its entire historical experience into account in order to prevent the disasters presaged in the CSR report from becoming reality.I nertia can’t last forever, even for the sake of stability.

Director Sergey Soloviev once said that when the final scenes of Assa were being filmed, no one in the massive crowd singing along with Tsoi understood what specific changes they were so passionately demanding. A quarter of a century is a long time, and today’s Russians are a great deal clearer about what they want. More aware than ever before, they still demand change.