In his recent The Wall Street Journal op-ed Andrei Piontkovsky emphasizes that there is no way to hold back the growing wave of protest in Russia. Below IMR reprints Piontkovsky’s answers to follow-up questions from WSJ readers.
As Mr. Piontkovsky writes in his op-ed, two events this year sharply accelerated the decline of Putin regime. The first one is Putin’s announcement to step back to the president office for a third term on Sept. 24. The second one is the parliamentary elections on Dec. 4, recognized as fraudulent by various independent observers and many Russian citizens, too.
“These events have completely undermined the legitimacy of Mr. Putin's regime and made it a laughing stock in the eyes of the general public. The presidential election scheduled for March 4, even if it results in an official "victory" for Mr. Putin, will likely be another major step toward the regime's downfall,” Piontkovsky predicts.
Pionkovsky goes on by comparing the Russian upheaval (on Dec. 10, more than 60,000 Russians turned out in the streets of Moscow to protest the regime) to the so called Arab Spring. “As with the Mubarak regime in Egypt earlier this year, the Putin regime has lost the battle for the hearts and minds of its own people. Among them were many young people who do not see any future under the current regime. After this protest, Russia will never again be the same.”
Though Russian authorities try to act like nothing is going on, blaming the protests on the U.S. Administration, who, in their words, sends out ‘signals’ to Russian opposition and tries to undermine them, Piotkovsky points out that they are aware of the situation they had put themselves and the country in. He quotes his conversation with one Kremlin ideologist who admitted that “it's too late to jump off the train. The new authorities will come after us and arrest us [if we lose power]. That's why we have no option but to keep running like a hamster on a wheel."
In the end Mr. Piontkovsky makes one crucial point: preservation of Putin regime is more risky than the collapse. “A Putin dismissal is the only chance we have to save Russia from the gangrene of systemic corruption”, he adds in conclusion.
Andrei Piontkovsky answered to the questions submitted at imrussia.org
Having received many comments and questions after the publication of the interview with Andrei Piontkovsky, IMR continues the discussion on Russia's political future. Today we publish Mr.Piontkovsky's answers to the most popular questions submitted by imrussia.org's audience.
Olga Khvostunova: Your assumption that once Mr.Putin returns to the office as a president, he might release Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, sparked major interest of the audience. Many consider this point at issue. Why do you think that Putin might make such a step?
Andrei Piontkovsky: First of all, I'd like to underline that it could never have happened during Medvedev's presidency, because then it would have created a very uncomfortable contrast: “evil” Putin imprisoned them, while “kind” Medvedev released. But during Putin’s upcoming presidency, under certain political circumstances, a form for releasing Khodorkovsky and Lebedev might be found.
O.Kh.: Can you give an example?
A.P.: Well, hypothetically, Kremlin's will to bring Viktor Bout back to Moscow might be such a circumstance.
If you follow closely what Bout's wife, Alla, was saying at the press-conferences, you may notice that her assessment of Russian authorities’ nonfeasance becomes more and more critical. She virtually sends an explicit message: Bout is not going to keep silence for long. And obviously, he has something to say. It is clear that being a young 20-year old Russian officer in early 1990s, Bout wasn’t able to build an arms traffic empire, especially when it’s the superior Soviet and Russian weapon systems we are talking about. It is clear that Bout had powerful patrons in the top echelons of power. Among the names mentioned in connection with Bout’s case is Igor Sechin, Putin’s close ally [and Russian Vice prime minister – O.Kh.]. This whole story is threatening to turn into a major sensation. And judging by the latest developments, Kremlin is ready to go almost any length to get Bout back. Here, I may assume that Putin might decide on exchanging Khodorkovsky and Lebedev for Bout. The question is whether Washington will be interested in such an exchange.
O.Kh.: Further to this topic is the question about other political prisoners. Some data shows that their number is up to 2,500 in the country. Would you agree with that estimation? Who can be considered a political prisoner for that matter?
A.P.: Businessmen, arrested by siloviki who wanted to take over their companies and property, can be considered political prisoners. As Olga Romanova’s investigation shows, for instance, their number is over dozens of thousand. Romanov’s husband Aleksei Kozlov was a political prisoner in that sense. Or, say, Yevgeny Chichvarkin, who was granted status of political immigrant in London. Based on this precedent, it is possible to say that similar cases should also be considered politically motivated, and their participants should be viewed as victims of predatory attacks of security agencies.
O.Kh.: What are the prisoners' chances?
A.P.: Since not all of them have spouses like Romanova, the chances of the majority are quite the those of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev: in the current regime it's hard to expect that they would be released and, all the more so, rehabilitated. But as I mentioned in our previous conversation, this regime is nondurable. And since that time, my assurance grew stronger.
O.Kh.: Do you mean that when the regime falls, all these people who are imprisoned at the moment and are considered political prisoners, will be released and rehabilitated?
A.P.: Certainly. And the regime's accomplices will incur responsibility for their crimes.
О.Kh.: Another problem that many worry about is the situation with the freedom of speach in Russia. What is your assessment: is there a censorship in Russian media?
A.P.: Putin's regime is a new type of athoritarianism that uses economical tools. There are no mass repressions, only pin-point ones. There is no censorship, only self-censorship. For this to happen, it was enough to take over one TV channel (NTV) and to kill a few well-known journalists — Yuri Shchekochikhin, Anna Politkovskaya, Natalia Estemirova. Though, in Russian regions, dozens of journalists were killed, too. If you compare these figures with Stalin’s times, you will see that today the scale is smaller: they are no dozens of thousands killed all over Russia. But now the frame of self-censorship is changing along with the atmosphere in civil society. Take internet, for example, where sharp criticism towards authorities prevails. Or take such a respectable radio station as Ekho Moskvy, who had always been trying to balance between opposition and loyalty to authorities, and who lately has started to demonstrate sharply critical attitude. Don’t forget that 51% of this radio station shares belong to Gazprom. For the first time ever they started to publish my blogs on their website— something they wouldn’t do for several years. A few new internet TV channels emerged, too — i.e. TV Rain. Only two or three federal TV channels remain as the bastions guarding the regime.
O.Kh.: So you observe improvements?
A.P.: Obviously, the regime is losing its popularity. It suffices to remember the latest example when Putin was booed at the martial arts fight. You might even notice that today I sound more optimistic than a month ago when we spoke last time. During this month a tectonic shift has happened in public conscience. Formally, there were no political events, but in people’s conscience these shifts take place daily. And they are not in favor of the regime.
O.Kh.: Still, many people are skeptical, saying that Putin is no fool, and he is perfectly aware of the state the society is in. And he still possesses sufficient resources to overcome the situation to his own benefit.
A.P.: The problem is that Putin and his entourage lost control over political processes. They make one mistake after another. It looks just ridiculous. It's indicative that critical moods start to prevail amidst the elites. But it looks like Putin’s spin-doctors are beginning to finally grasp it. A short time ago two major political events have been cancelled. In the end of November Medvedev was supposed to make his annual address to the Federal Assembly, and Putin was expected to take part in the annual TV show where he is allegedly speaking to the people in a live television broadcast. Both these events were cancelled, because it seems that some smart people figured out that they events might cause only damage to the election campaign. And as for Putin’s being no fool, I have said it before and will repeat now, he entered the phase of clinical insanity and lost touch with reality. All these factors indicate that the decay of power is irreversible and it has been spurred after September 24th.
