The Russian authorities are continuing their widely publicized “campaign against corruption.” Having studied the proposed measures intended to stop bribe-taking among officials, IMR Advisor Boris Bruk has concluded that they are unlikely to achieve the desired results.
In March, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for “regulating the civil service as well as countering corruption” and for developing anticorruption measures, published a document with the quaint title: “Review of recommendations to implement a set of organizational, explanatory, and other measures to prevent public servants’ behavior that might be regarded by others that they are to promise or offer a bribe, an agreement to accept a bribe, or as a request for a bribe.” To prevent unacceptable behavior, the document suggests, among other measures, offering seminars (training sessions) and developing recommendations and informational leaflets that would inform officials of the potential criminal and administrative penalties for “accepting or offering a bribe.”
It is expected that the seminars will provide civil servants with specific guidance on how to avoid unacceptable behavior. A complete understanding how officials should act will supposedly be achieved when “civil servants and employees” learn: the words, expressions, and even gestures that others “might consider as a request (a hint) for offering a bribe;” and the “necessity to refrain from using such expressions while interacting with the public.” The following are among the most dangerous phrases a bureaucrat can utter: “this problem is hard to solve, but might be possible;” “a word of thanks does not put butter on the bread;” “it is possible to come to an agreement on this,” “more solid arguments are needed,” “we may need to discuss the parameters,” “so, what are we going to do?”
The seminars will provide civil servants with specific guidance on how to avoid unacceptable behavior.
There have been varied reactions to the Labor Ministry’s recommendations. Some see this document as both funny and ludicrous. Others have limited their comments to just a few words such as “profanation” and “nonsense.” Other critics were more diplomatic and simply stated that the document would not help reduce corruption. According to a survey conducted by Garant, 80 percent of respondents believe that the recommendations will not change the situation in government agencies and that corruption will not be reduced. Ivan Ninenko, deputy director of Transparency International – Russia, suggested that the Labor Ministry should give more attention to dealing with “opportunities for corrupt interactions” rather than “outlining particular phrases.” In his view, “Control of the civil servants is the heart of the matter.”
The questions of control and responsibility are among the key issues in political science and public administration, in addition to being part of the discussion of the Labor Ministry’s initiative and the current anticorruption campaign. A good example of the scientific discussion in this area is the famous 1940s debate between Karl Friedrich and Herman Finer on the topic of administrative responsibility. According to Finer, public servants “are to be responsible to the elected representatives of the public, and these are to determine the course of action of the public servants to the most minute degree that is technically feasible.”1 Finer believed that, without external controls and punitive mechanisms, abuse of power was inevitable. Friedrich’s opinion was quite different: external mechanisms of bureaucratic control were not as important as the “inner check” of norms and values.2 In a democratic system, what counts most are the moral dimensions of administrative responsibility, and the sense of public duty and obligation that motivate civil servants to adhere to professional standards.
In 2012, Russia ranked 133rd out of 176 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index.
According to Finer’s logic, the Labor Ministry’s document, which in its detail goes even further than Russian administrative regulations, should be considered a success since its recommendations accurately point officials in the right anticorruption direction. Greedy bureaucrats will now know which specific words and expressions they are not permitted to use. In addition to that, at the seminars, there will be live demonstrations that show officials what gestures are unacceptable because they could be considered an inducement to offer a bribe. With these measures, the activities of officials would be regulated down to the smallest detail and, accordingly, limited. Finer’s followers believe that by destroying the bureaucrat’s room for maneuver, corruption will be conquered.
Unfortunately, one senses that this will never work for any one of a number of reasons which have been discussed in more than a few articles. Such articles have noted the purely “decorative” PR nature of the current anticorruption campaign, the futility of anticorruption efforts in the absence of political reform, as well as the “permanence,” “necessity,” and “pervasiveness” of corruption.
Putting aside those reasons and coming back to the Friedrich-Finer debate, one might argue that many attempts to limit the conduct of officials are superficial and do not affect the hearts and minds or the mentality of civil servants. Today, corruption is mostly understood from a legal perspective as an “unlawful action,” which is “based on the abuse of public or private office for personal gain.” One should not forget, however, that in a broader sense, corruption can be understood as behavior (or action) that contradicts ethical norms. As experience demonstrates, “…corruption increases in an environment where ethical norms of an organization have degenerated.” Not surprisingly, a large body of literature points out that despite the restrictions placed on bureaucratic organs, public administration is “not a kind of technology,” but rather serves as an integral part of the political process and represents (or should represent) a “form of moral endeavor.”3 The “moral endeavor” should embrace and be guided by particular values, such as, for example,“regime values,”4 “public interest”5 or “social equity.”6
In a broader sense, corruption can be understood as behavior that contradicts ethical norms.
It cannot be said that the question of ethical values has been fully ignored in Russia. These were to be found in the presidential decree “On adopting the general principles of conduct for public officials” issued in 2002, and, later, in a number of federal laws, and a model code of ethics and official conduct developed by the Ministry of Health and Social Development. However, the question is, to what extent the initiatives dealing with the ethical dimension of civil service are taken seriously in what is generally a limited and often negative legalistic context? It is known that while ethical factors “appeal to the best part of human nature, legal factors with their emphasis on sanctions and fear of punishments [appeal] to the worst.”7 It is also known that excessive controls are unlikely to lead to a positive outcome, but, on the contrary, may even worsen the situation.8
Another question then arises: should more attention be given to ethical and moral issues, particularly to the relationship of morality and law as it applies to public administration? In December 2012, the Labor Ministry issued an order drawing up a code of ethics and official conduct for its personnel. It is unclear whether this code would be helpful in providing moral guidance to officials. Based on a number of paragraphs prohibiting or requesting them to abstain from certain actions or behavior, one might suggest that the code is just another in a series of documents that focus on the idea of bureaucratic control. In fact, in its essence, the code of ethics and official conduct is consistent with the Labor Ministry’s “Review of recommendations ….” Paul Appleby, a well-known public administration scholar, once said that “good government must be realistic, but it must be idealistic, too.”9 It appears that he was mistaken. Or perhaps the problem is not with him?
1 Finer, H. (1941). “Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government.” Public Administration Review, 1(4), 335-350.
2 Friedrich, C. J. (1940). “Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility.” In Public Policy. Harvard University Press.
3 Hart, D. K. (1984). The Virtuous Citizen, the Honorable Bureaucrat, and “Public” Administration.” Public Administration Review, 44 (Special Issue): 111–120.
4 Rohr, J. A. (1989). Ethics for Bureaucrats: An Essay on Law and Values. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
5 Goodsell, C. T. (1990). “Public Administration and the Public Interest.” Wamsley et al. (eds.) Refounding Public Administration, 96–113. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
6 Rawls, J. (2005). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
7 Оболонский А. В. «Мораль и право в политике и управлении». М. 2006.
8 Fesler, J.W. & Kettl, D. F. (1991). The Politics of the Administrative Process. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
9 Appleby, P. H. (1947). Toward Better Public Administration. Public Administration Review, 7(2), 93-99.
