The protest sentiments manifested in recent months at mass rallies across Russia have reached the halls of the State Duma which had long ceased to be a “place for discussion.” Just three opposition lawmakers – Gennady Gudkov, Dimitri Gudkov, and Ilya Ponomarev – restored the half-forgotten atmosphere of parliamentary debates to the Duma chamber. The authorities, not surprisingly, are not tolerating this situation: Gudkov Sr. has already been expelled from parliament, while Ponomarev has been deprived of the right to speak (so far, for one month). IMR Advisor Vladimir Kara-Murza discusses the prospects for dissent in the Russian legislature.
Earlier this August, a draft law banning government officials from owning real estate outside Russia or having offshore bank accounts was submitted to the State Duma. It seems that the bill has not been taken seriously by the officials, nor by the press, since, in Russia, similar restrictions have been traditionally evaded, and many government officials and deputies – with no fear of disclosure –are successfully combining business with public service. On the other hand, the media has reported, based on unofficial leaks, that Vladimir Putin issued a secret order requiring government officials to return their assets from abroad within a year. Those who disobey will be punished. Until now, foreign assets served as restraint on the road toward full-blown authoritarianism. Tatyana Stanovaya, IMR expert and the head of the Analytics Department of the Center for Political Technologies, discusses what could happen if this prohibition stands and whether the “end of Courchevel” (i.e. end of foreign property ownership) is will also be the end of Democratic Russia.
Last week, the electoral commission in Khimki, a northern suburb of Moscow, completed the nomination process for the upcoming mayoral election. Twenty-six candidates are planning to take part in the October 14th vote, with nine of them already registered. Yet the real battle will be between two contenders: Oleg Shakhov, the regime-backed candidate, and Yevgenia Chirikova, a leader of the Russian opposition. IMR Advisor Vladimir V. Kara-Murza discusses the importance of this campaign for the country’s protest movement.
September 15th is the last day for candidates to register for election to the Coordinating Council of the Russian opposition. According to its proponents, the new structure, by having elected members, will legitimize opposition leaders in the eyes of the grassroots, and consolidate the protest movement, which has become a major force following the mass rallies in 2011 and 2012. Yet not all opposition figures are backing this idea: skeptics fear that internal competition will weaken the protest movement and lead to a split in its ranks.
The first hundred days of Putin's “new” presidency have been marked by a severe tightening of the screws. Laws on public rallies, defamation, and “foreign agents,” hastily rubberstamped by the Federal Assembly and signed by the President, further restrict civil society’s ability to function. Yet, a significant concession forced on the Kremlin by its opponents at the height of the December protests – liberalized rules for registering political parties – continues to stand, and may even come to fruition this fall. IMR first addressed the resurgence of Russia's opposition parties in Olga Khvostunova's article "Party Renaissance." Historian and political commentator Vladimir V. Kara-Murza discusses Russia’s new multiparty system.
In December of 2011 a new political phenomenon has taken shape in Russia. Its key features include the mobilization of the urban class angered by the increasingly repressive regime, and the confrontation between the actively dissenting minority and the conformist majority of the population. As Russian opposition functioning outside of the official political system is groping for possible ways of action in this new reality, numerous inquiries on ways to organize are surfacing with questions such as: What strategy would work best? Does it make any sense to engage with the Kremlin? Is there a need for a unifying political platform and a united party? Tatyana Stanovaya, IMR advisor and Head of Analytics Department at the Center of Political Technologies, provides us with her insights on, and some answers to these questions.
The first two months of Vladimir Putin’s latest presidency have effectively ended the dialogue between the authorities and opposition forces. Putin’s administration has passed stringent new legislation on non-profit organizations; imposed de facto censorship on the Internet; and publicly persecuted opposition leaders and demonstrators, among other anti-democratic offenses. Against this backdrop, the state is also finally creating a public television network. Presumably, this new outlet will be another tool the government uses in to attempts to turn public opinion in its favor instead of a forum for building a healthy media environment Tatyana Stanovaya, head of the Center for Political Technologies analytics department, explains why public television as it is understood in the West won't thrive in Russia.
This month's flooding in the southern Russian town of Krymsk, which left 172 dead, have illustrated two important new realities of Russian politics. First of all, public trust in the government has reached the point of no return as, by and large, statements issued by government officials are now seen as lies by many in Russia. Secondly, due to the ineffectiveness of government measures, growing numbers of citizens’ groups have appeared in order to fill the gap, effectively creating alternative agencies of self-government.
The Kremlin has been pursuing an increasingly hardline policy toward autonomous and opposition-minded agencies. The law on the liability for participating or organizing protests has been made more punitive; opposition leaders have been subjected to apartment searches; the authorities have made the first arrests of the so-called 'provocateurs'. Now the Kremlin is flexing its muscle by imposing new regulations on the Presidential Council on Civil Society Development and Human Rights. Officials apparently believe that government-affiliated body has failed Putin's test of loyalty. The chasm between government and society is seemingly becoming unbridgeable. Tatiana Stanovaya, head of the Center of Political Technologies analytics department, describes the intricacies of the relationship between Russian human rights advocates and the government.
On June 11th, 2012, a day before one of Russian opposition’s largest protest rallies, law enforcement officials conducted searches of ten opposition leaders’ apartments, including those of lawyer Alexey Navalny, Left Front leader Sergey Udaltsov, television personality Ksenia Sobchak, and Solidarnost' Movement leaders Boris Nemtsov and Ilya Yashin. The opposition leaders were also summoned for interrogations, all of which were scheduled for June 12th at 11 AM, that is, an hour before the March of the Millions was set to start. The news of these raids spread through the Russian Internet like wildfire. On Twitter, #privet37 (“Hello,1937”, referencing the year when Stalin’s mass executions of “enemies of the people” reached their peak), appeared in the top five worldwide trending topics several times throughout the course of the day. Tatiana Stanovaya, head of the Center for Political Technologies analytics department, presents her take on the Kremlin’s rationale.
Page 20 of 21
Our newsletter delivers a digest of analytical articles and op-eds published on our website, along with the latest updates on the IMR activities on a monthly basis.