The participation of Russian opposition politician Vladimir Ryzhkov in a recent Kremlin meeting with Vladimir Putin has reignited the debate about whether it is acceptable for the democratic opposition to engage with the leader of an authoritarian regime. Author and human rights activist Alexander Podrabinek contends that such rituals only benefit the authorities.
Vladimir Putin’s return to the Kremlin gave the police and security forces an opportunity to take revenge for their losses during Dmitri Medvedev’s presidency. Practically all of the initiatives of the former Russian president and current prime minister have been revised—a state of affairs that Medvedev has usually taken lying down. However, in November, for the first time in eighteen months, Medvedev decided to publicly criticize a bill introduced to the State Duma by Putin. In response, the president as good as threatened the head of the Russian government with dismissal. According to political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya, Russian business is being put at the mercy of the security forces.
The leaders of Russia’s opposition are increasingly beholden to the “theory of small deeds,” trying to improve certain aspects of the political and social life. Author and human rights activist Alexander Podrabinek contends that the opposition should aim to dismantle, not improve Russia’s current regime.
At the end of October, Kremlin Chief-of-Staff Sergei Ivanov and his deputy Vyacheslav Volodin attended a meeting of municipal mayors from the Moscow region and indicated that they wanted their audience to be more responsive to voters’ needs and more open to the involvement of civil society. Donald N. Jensen, Resident Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, contends that there is no sign that the Kremlin will permit anything that threatens the president’s power or fundamentally alters Russian politics.
Petty pride and the fear of looking weak are two of the many qualities that differentiate fearful dictatorships from self-confident democracies. Strong political systems feel no need to be constantly proving their power, whereas weak ones are driven by an inferiority complex. Russia is not yet a dictatorship, but judging by the regime’s excessive reactions to pinpricks, it is already exhibiting some of the psychological characteristics of one. Author and publicist Alexander Podrabinek discusses the seizure of the Greenpeace International ship Arctic Sunrise with thirty people on board.
In October, the head of the Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights and Human Welfare Gennady Onishchenko—a legendary figure in Russian politics—lost his job. He was a key player in the Kremlin’s introduction of trade sanctions against “problem countries.” Sources in the media say that a possible reason for his resignation was mental insanity. However, political scientist Tatyana Stanovaya believes that insanity has become the norm in Russia’s new political reality.
The visit by Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev to China once again highlighted the strategic importance that Moscow attaches to Asia. Donald N. Jensen, Resident Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, notes that the prospects for cooperation with Beijing may not be as good as the Kremlin hopes.
This fall, prominent U.S. political scientist Ilan Berman presented his new book titled Implosion: The End of Russia and What It Means for America, in which he analyzes Russia’s transformation and identifies a number of key trends that define its domestic and foreign policies. Harriman Institute Visiting Scholar Daria Mattis reviews the book.
On October 25, 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of the Yukos oil company and chairman of the Open Russia Foundation, was arrested at the Novosibirsk airport. A decade later, he remains Russia’s most prominent political prisoner. IMR Senior Policy Advisor Vladimir Kara-Murza considers that day to have been the turning point in the modern history of Russia, and the Khodorkovsky case to be the most vivid symbol of the country’s authoritarian regime.
In late September, former deputy Kremlin chief-of-staff Vladislav Surkov returned to the Kremlin as an assistant to President Vladimir Putin. Political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya discusses why the Russian leader needed to rehabilitate the former “eminence grise.”
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